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 In a private company setting corporate governance institutions can be viewed 
as responses to the contractual challenges of moral hazard, adverse selection and 
incompleteness  of  contracts.  Thereupon,  the  attributes  of  corporate  governance 
mechanisms are structured in a way that allows the corporate constituencies to deal 
with  contractual  design  exigencies.  Contract  theory  is  thus  a  determinant  of 
corporate governance. 
VC-backed firms provide an explicit manifestation of this philosophy of design 
of corporate governance institutions. The financing practices that VC firms implement 
and the securities that they hold are carefully designed so as to allow the members of 
the  firm  to  surmount  the  contractual  obstacles.  Staged  investment  (or  staggered 
financing)  is  a  screening  mechanism  that  induces  entrepreneurs  to  signal  their 
intrinsic motivation to the VC firm and thus allows the latter to tackle the adverse 
selection problem. Convertible preferred stock, the VCs’ investing vehicle of choice, 
allows the establishment of an incentive-compatible income stream, as it replicates 
the disciplining and agency cost-mitigating effects of paradigm debt while at the same 
time it eliminates the foremost agency cost of paradigm debt, the “asset substitution 
effect”. Consequently, with the “debtlike” security of convertible preferred stock VCs 
can cope efficiently with the problem of moral hazard. In addition to this, the typical 
covenants  that  are  embedded  in  convertible  preferred  stock  help  to  generate  an 
optimal  state-contingent  allocation  of  control  rights  between  the  VC  and  the 
entrepreneur  that  is  in  alignment  with  the  basic  axioms  of  financial  contracting 
theory.  Thereupon,  convertible  preferred  stock  serves  as  a  corporate  governance 
mechanism that challenges the problem of the incompleteness of contracts. 
Finally, given that the design of efficient corporate governance institutions in 
a VC setting requires a great deal of contracting flexibility, we look at the mandatory 
nature  of  European  corporate  laws  and  seek  to  ascertain  whether  they  directly 
impede VC contracting. Although no such evidence is found, it is argued that the 
overall  mandatory  nature  of  European  corporate  laws  compromises  the  contract 
innovation capacity of European lawyers, who, paralyzed by anchoring bias, do not 
invest  in  learning  sophisticated  VC  financial  and  corporate  governance  design 
techniques that would let the VC industry in Europe flourish.  
 
                                                 
   LL.M.  Candidate  in  Corporate  Law  &  Governance,  Harvard  Law  School, 
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Since the turn of the century and the Enron-class corporate scandals the debate on 
corporate governance has been shaped by a massive complex of realized or contemplated 
legal  reforms.  The  introduction  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  in  2002,  the  proposed 
amendments  to  the  proxy  rules  regarding  shareholder  access  and  lately  the  proposed 
regulations pertaining to executive compensation have all led to a unidirectional view of 
corporate governance emanating from state actors and imposed upon corporations. This 
top-down  perspective  has  shifted  the  focus  away  from  the  plethora  of  corporate 
governance  institutions  that  do  not  stem  from  state  or  federal  law,  but  are  privately 
designed by the corporate constituencies and are legitimized through their inclusion in the 
firm’s charter or bylaws. To put it differently, now that the Congress and the SEC have 
started interfering more with internal corporate affairs the study of the contribution of 
private ordering to the US corporate governance system is to a certain extent put aside in 
the corporate law literature. 
This  paper  seeks  to  rejuvenate  the  interest  in  private  corporate  governance 
institutions by attempting to reconcile corporate governance with contract theory. The 
underlying  theme  of  the  paper  is  that  the  comprehension  of  the  factors  that  shape 
corporate governance in a private company setting presupposes the comprehension of the   5 
factors that impact contract design. In reality, many of the governance mechanisms that 
are  designed  by  the  parties  to  the  corporate  contract  are  essentially  devices  used  to 
mitigate the various contractual impasses that contract theory identifies. The features of 
the contractual problems of adverse selection, moral hazard and incompleteness actually 
act  as  determinants  of  corporate  governance  planning.  In  other  words,  corporate 
governance  institutions  are  a  response  to  contractual  design  exigencies.  Without 
corporate  governance  the  members  of  the  firm  would  have  no  way  to  fend  off  the 
cognitive chaos that derives from the problems of hidden knowledge, hidden action and 
unanticipated contingencies, to which the corporate contract gives rise. 
To illustrate this argument I use the example of venture capital, where start-up 
firms and venture capitalists, acting within the scope of the enabling regime of state 
corporate law and free of the burdens of federal securities regulation or listing standards, 
draft  their  financial  contract  in  a  way  that  allows  an  optimal  corporate  governance 
structure to be established in the venture-backed firm. In Parts II and III of the paper I 
show step-by-step how the venture capital financial contract is designed in order to put in 
place governance tools that will help the parties surmount the three basic problems of 
contracting. 
In Part I of the paper I explain the contractarian foundations of the firm by using 
concepts of agency theory and transaction-cost economics. I introduce the term “lato 
sensu incompleteness of contracts”, which includes not only the traditional (stricto sensu) 
incompleteness of contracts, namely the fact that the parties to a contract cannot foresee 
all  future  contingencies,  but  also  the  two  other  major  contractual  problems  of  moral 
hazard  and  adverse  selection.  I,  then,  present  my  main  argument  that  corporate   6 
governance mechanisms in a private company setting are actually devices, with which 
corporate constituencies try to tackle this three-dimensional lato sensu incompleteness of 
contracts,  so  that  a  private  firm’s  governance  structure  will  reflect  the  severity  and 
peculiarities of this contractual challenge. 
In Part II I present the strategies employed by venture capitalists to deal with the 
problem of adverse selection. I argue that, although staged investment is viewed by the 
majority of the venture capital literature as a monitoring device, it should also be viewed 
as  a  screening  mechanism;  a  corporate  governance  institution  that  helps  the  venture 
capitalist respond to the pooling problem. To substantiate my argument I use concepts of 
behavioral labor economics and I show how staged investment can lead the entrepreneurs 
to signal their intrinsic motivation to the venture capitalist. As a side issue, I examine 
how  the  venture  capital  fund  partnership  agreement  allows  the  venture  capitalist  to 
credibly commit to a staged investment, which because of the “soft-budget constraints 
syndrome” other financial intermediaries cannot do.  
In Part III I demonstrate the significance of security design for a firm’s corporate 
governance structure by using the example of convertible preferred stock, which is the 
investing vehicle of choice of venture capitalists in the US. I postulate that convertible 
preferred  stock  should  not  be  viewed  as  a  mere  financial  instrument,  but  as  a  self-
sufficient  corporate  governance  institution.  Using  a  novel  technique  established  by 
Moody’s for the evaluation of hybrid securities, I prove that with convertible preferred 
stock venture capitalists can create a “debtlike” payoff structure that can replicate the 
disciplining effects that debt has according to the theories of capital structure. I also show 
that convertible preferred stock is even superior to paradigm debt for the financing of   7 
start-up firms, because it preserves debt’s beneficial incentivizing features, but also helps 
the venture capitalist avoid the harmful “asset substitution effect” that pure debt might 
create. While these two elements prove that convertible preferred stock is a governance 
device ideally designed by venture capitalists to deal with the problem of moral hazard, I 
also  suggest  that  this  corporate  security  can  help  them  structure  a  complementary 
screening  mechanism  that  will  induce  entrepreneurs  to  signal  their  confidence  in  the 
project. Finally, I demonstrate that the state-contingent allocation of control rights that is 
obtained through the proper design of convertible preferred stock is in alignment with the 
axioms of financial contracting theory and the contingent control model the latter puts 
forward. Thereupon, convertible preferred stock proves also to be an efficient governance 
tool  to  fend  off  against  the  third  major  contractual  challenge,  the  stricto  sensu 
incompleteness of contracts. 
In Part IV, by relying on the conclusions derived from Parts II and III, I start my 
analysis with the premise that the design of optimal corporate governance institutions in 
venture-backed  firms  requires  a  great  deal  of  contracting  flexibility.  I  then  pose  the 
question of whether the inferior performance of the venture capital industry in Europe 
could be attributed partially to the mandatory nature of European corporate laws that do 
not allow for such a great flexibility. By looking at several European corporate statutes 
and by examining empirical data of venture capital financings in Europe I conclude that 
there are no specific prohibitions for European venture capitalists to privately design US-
style  tools  for  the  financing  of  a  start-up  firm.  However,  I  argue  that  the  general 
mandatory  character  of  European  corporate  laws  leads  law  firms  to  underinvest  in 
contract  innovation,  which  is  an  indispensable  element  of  success  of  venture  capital   8 
financing.  The  general  rigidity  of  European  corporate  laws  creates  what  behavioral 
psychology  refers  to  as  anchoring  bias,  which  deters  lawyers  in  Europe  from  being 
innovative  and  from  expending  costs  to  learn  how  to  use  the  financially  optimal 
instrument of convertible preferred stock. This results in less expertise in the design of 
contracts,  which  might  in  turn  lead  to  suboptimal  corporate  governance  structures  in 
venture-backed firms. Creating the conditions for lawyers to be innovative when drafting 
financial  contracts  optimizes  the  contribution  of  private  ordering  to  corporate 
governance. 
Part V briefly concludes. 
 
 
I. The Contractarian Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance 
A.  The  departure  from  the  neoclassical  theory  of  the  firm  and  the  “nexus  of 
contracts” approach 
 
For the greatest part of the 20
th century most of the academic literature produced 
in the field of the theory of organizations was influenced by the neoclassical conception 
of exchange, as it was established by the Walrasian exchange theory
1. Based on this 
model of exchange, the firm was represented by a production function, which specified 
the  level  of  output  that  is  obtained  when  given  levels  of  inputs  are  chosen
2.  The 
production opportunity set available to the firm was defined in terms of its boundary; 
what is the maximum obtainable output quantity for different levels of input quantities, 
                                                 
1 See LEON VALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (W. Jaffe, trans.) (1954), pts. I-III; KNUT WICKSELL, 
LECTURES ON POLITICAL ECONOMY, vol. 1, pt. 1 
2 ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1995), ch.5   9 
given the state of technology and knowledge
3? Within the neoclassical paradigm the firm 
was viewed as a “black box”
4, where everything operates smoothly and efficiently, while 
the internal decision making machinery was not explicated
5. Despite the fact that there 
had  been  some  critical  approaches  to  this  view  of  the  firm
6,  the  vast  majority  of 
economists insisted on portraying the firm as implicitly marginalistic
7 and they focused 
exclusively on how firms make the optimal production choices. In a perfectly competitive 
market, the members of the firm would have the proper incentives for maximizing their 
utility  levels  and  they  would  move  towards  profit  maximization,  which  implies  cost 
minimization. There was no worry about how the owners of the firm succeed in aligning 
the objectives of its various members. Incentive considerations that could arise from the 
assumption that the members of the firm have individually different objectives were not 
incorporated in the neoclassical model.  Even authors who conducted research within the 
framework of the theory of teams and recognized the decentralized nature of information 
within a team postulated identical objective functions for the members of a firm
8. This 
seemed to be a broader problem of the general equilibrium theory, which did not account 
for informational asymmetries and the full complexity of strategic interactions between 
privately  informed  agents
9.  At  the  same  time,  the  neoclassical  paradigm  gave  no 
                                                 
3  Michael  Jensen  &  William  Meckling,  Rights  and  Production  Functions:  An  Application  to  Labor-
Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 469, 470 
4 Jim Tomlinson,  Democracy Inside the Black Box? Neoclassical Theories of  the Firm and Industrial 
Democracy  1,  15  ECONOMY  AND  SOCIETY  220,  220;  see  also  Kenneth  Arrow,  Foreword,  in  FIRMS, 
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (G. CARROLL & D. TEECE eds.,1999), vii: “Any standard economic theory, not 
just neoclassical, starts from the existence of firms. Usually, the firm is a point or at any rate a black box”. 
5 MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS- OR HOW ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN (1992), 98  
6 ROBERT HALL & CHARLES HITCH, PRICE THEORY AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR (1939), 12-45 
7  Ronald  Edwards,  The  Pricing  of  Manufactured  Products,  19  ECONOMICA,  298,  298;  M.  FRIEDMAN, 
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953),  21 
8 See e.g. JACOB MARSCHAK & ROY RADNER, ECONOMIC THEORY OF TEAMS (1972)  
9 BERNARD SALANIE, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: A PRIMER (2005), 1-2    10 
explanation why particular activities are organized within firms; in other words it did not 
pin down the boundaries of the firm, thus failing to explain differences in size and shape. 
With all these questions unanswered the time came to open the “black box” and examine 
the actual workings of the  corporate mechanism inside
10. 
The question that the neoclassical theory of the firm left open with regard to the 
boundaries of the firm was addressed by Ronald Coase in his much celebrated paper The 
Nature of the Firm
11. Coase argued that outside the firm the price mechanism operates in 
all transactions, while within the firm operations are controlled by the direction of the 
entrepreneur. The range of transactions over which the price mechanism is replaced by 
the  authority  of  an  entrepreneur-coordinator  constitutes  the  boundaries  of  the  firm
12. 
Direction by the entrepreneur can be more efficient than using the price mechanism; in 
other words organizational costs can be lower than price mechanism costs and whenever 
this is the case, the firm structure will be preferred instead of contracting in the open 
market.  
While Coase focused on the boundaries of the firm by emphasizing the role of 
authority  in  distinguishing  it  from  what  happens  in  the  conventional  market,  another 
group of authors buckled down to the task of integrating incentive considerations in the 
theory of the firm. This new way to study the firm was the result of a general departure 
from the general equilbrium theory, which did not encompass asymmetric information 
and the potential for manipulation of private information that economic agents might 
                                                 
10 AVINASH DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY (1996), 9  
11 16 ECONOMICA, 386  
12 Melvin Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of 
the Firm, 24 JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW, 819, 820    11 
possess
13.  The starting point of these authors’ analysis was the assumption that some of 
the inputs of the firm’s production function may have a quality that is endogenous, rather 
than exogenous
14. That means that the value of an input, which will affect the production 
output, may depend partially on the effort the manager expends, so that a key issue in 
every firm is how to provide the manager with the proper incentives to improve this 
quality. The reference to the matter of incentives linked the whole issue to the so-called 
“incentive theory”
15, which analyzes the problem of delegating a task to an agent with 
private information
16. Thus, the principal-agent model started to play a key role in the 
discourse  about  the  theory  of  the  firm.  This  model  uses  the  contract  governing  the 
relationship between the principal and the agent as the unit of analysis for the firm
17, thus 
departing from the neoclassical paradigm and the “authoritarian” Coasean approach
18 and 
hence moving towards a contractarian approach. 
  Jensen  and  Meckling
19  with  the  aid  of  the  micro-analytical  tools  of  contract 
theory
20  identified  the  separation  of  finance  and  management
21  –already  effectively 
                                                 
13 SALANIE, supra note 9, 2  
14 OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, (1995), 18 
15 It seems that often the term “incentive theory” is used to refer to the discourse of the same issues, on 
which contract theory focuses. This could be attributed to the fact that contract theory is a relatively young 
discipline and thus does not enjoy the privilege of appearing under a consistent name; see Eric Brousseau & 
Jean-Michel Gachant, The Economics of Contracts and the Renewal of Economics, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
CONTRACTS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS (E. BROUSSEAU & J.-M. GACHANT eds., 2002), 3-6   
16 Eric Maskin, Roy Radner and Incentive Theory, 6 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN 311, 311  
17  Kathleen  Eisenhardt,  Agency  Theory:  An  Assessment  and  Review,  14  ACADEMY  OF  MANAGEMENT 
REVIEW 57, 59; However, Michael Jensen indicates that “the individual agent is the elementary unit of 
analysis” for agency theory, see Michael Jensen, Organization Theory and Methodology, 53 ACCOUNTING 
REVIEW 319, 327, but this indeed implicates the study of contracting. 
18 For objections of the contractarians against the coercionist approach of Ronald Coase see Armen Alchian 
& Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW 777  
19 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, 3 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 305 
20 Jacques Lenoble, From an Incentive to a Reflexive Approach to Corporate Governance, in COPRORATE 
GOVERNANCE: AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH (2003), 20   12 
located by Berle and Means
22- as the essence of the agency problem of the firm and 
focused their efforts on developing the most efficient contract governing the financier-
manager relationship given assumptions about people, organization and information
23. 
Under the contractarian approach, transactions within the firm and transactions outside 
the firm are part of a continuum of contractual relations
24. Therefore, the firm is not an 
arena for authority and direction as Coase postulated, but an arena for making contracts
25; 
a nexus for a set of contractual relationships
26. The term “contract”, however, in this 
context does not refer to the legal notion of contract, but has a much broader range of 
coverage
27; it refers to an economist’s view of the contract as any reciprocal institutional 
arrangement  between  two  or  more  parties  that  influences  and  coordinates  strategic 
interactions between the individual decision makers
28. 
                                                 
21  The  more  standard  terminology  is  “separation  of  ownership  and  control”  (see  e.g.  Eugene  Fama  & 
Michael Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 301), but in 
my view separation of finance and management conveys the agency problem better. 
22 ADOLPH BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) 
23 The issue of incentives in management was touched upon explicitly almost fifty years before Jensen and 
Meckling developed the agency theory framework by Chester Barnard in his book THE FUNCTIONS OF THE 
EXECUTIVE (1938), 139: “An essential element of organizations is the willingness of persons to contribute 
their individual efforts to the cooperative system… Inadequate incentives mean dissolution or changes of 
organization purpose, or failure to cooperate. Hence, in all sorts of organizations the affording of adequate 
incentives becomes the most definitely emphasized task in their existence. It is probably in this aspect of 
executive work that failure is most pronounced”. 
24 Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1757, 
1764 
25 Jeffrey Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1549, 1549  
26 Eisenberg, supra note 12, 823  
27 YUWA WEI, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE (2003), 44  
28 Brousseau & Glachant, supra note 15, 3; URS SCHWEIZER, VERTRAGSTHEORIE (1999), 5. Especially, in 
the venture capital literature, to which we will turn shortly, the term “contract” is also very often used in its 
broad sense, as including not only explicit enforceable contractual provisions, but also implicit reciprocal 
arrangements; see Bernard Black & Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: 
Banks  versus  Stock  Markets,  47  JOURNAL  OF  FINANCIAL  ECONOMICS  243,  261ff.;  Ulrich  Hege  et  al., 
Determinants of Venture Capital Performance: Europe and the United States, LSE Working Paper Nov. 
2003, 2 available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/RICAFE/pdf/RICAFE-WP01-Hege.pdf   13 
As  it  will  become  evident  in  the  following  sections,  the  establishment  of  the 
contractarian approach to the firm is of great significance for the way we think (or ought 
to think) about corporate governance nowadays
29. 
B.  Transaction-Cost  Economics,  Incomplete  Contracting  and  the  Need  for 
Corporate Governance 
 
Despite  the  fact  that  it  was  Jensen  and  Meckling’s  paper  that  introduced  the 
contractarian approach to the firm
30, the spread of the idea that the theory of the firm is an 
extension  of  the  theory  of  contracts  is  customarily  credited  to  a  stream  of  economic 
thought known as “Transaction-Cost Economics”, which includes the work of Oliver 
Williamson
31, Oliver Hart
32 and Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian
33. 
These authors, starting with Coase’s idea –despite the fact that Coase could be considered 
as an authoritarianist in terms of the theory of the firm
34- that there are transaction costs 
in writing a contract, postulated that parties to a relationship will fail to write a contract 
                                                 
29 The contractarian approach to the firm is prevalent in the US corporate thought. Nonetheless, it does not 
seem  to  be  a  universal  idea.  In  Germany,  for  instance,  the  German  Constitutional  Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) has indirectly rejected the view of the firm as a nexus of contracts by explicitly 
recognizing the firm as a joint undertaking of labor and capital. According to this judicial opinion the 
economic view of the firm should be complemented with a social approach, which would conceive the firm 
as  the  joint  undertaking  of  labor  and  capital  (“Diese  ist  der  Preis  der  angestrebten  Ergänzung  der 
ökonomischen durch eine soziale Legitimation der Unternehmensleitung in größeren Unternehmen, der 
Kooperation  und  Integration  aller  im  Unternehmen  tätigen  Kräfte,  deren  Kapitaleinsatz  und  Arbeit 
Voraussetzung  der  Existenz  und  der  Wirksamkeit  des  Unternehmens  ist”);  Entscheidungen  des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts Bd. 50, 290, 352.  
30 Lenoble, supra note 20, 20 
31 OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); 
Oliver Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 JOURNAL 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985)  
32 Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND 
ORGANIZATION 119  
33  Benjamin  Klein  et  al.,  Vertical  Integration,  Appropriable  Rents  and  the  Competitive  Contracting 
Process, 21 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 297  
34 Alice Belcher, The Boundaries of the Firm: The Theories of Coase, Knight and Weitzman, 17 LEGAL 
STUDIES 22, 22; contra Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 JOURNAL 
OF FINANCE 737, 740   14 
that anticipates all future contingencies.  Given the behavioral economics axiom
35 that 
human agents are subject to a bounded rationality
36, which means that perfectly rational 
decisions are not feasible due to the finite computational resources available for making 
them
37,  contracts  will  necessarily  be  incomplete.  They  will  contain  gaps  or  missing 
provisions, as rational actors must exercise judgment in a context of uncertainty
38 and 
some important future variables have to be left out of the contract, because they may be 
difficult or even impossible to predict or describe
39. Complete contingent contracts that 
specify  obligations  in  each  possible  state  of  the  world  are  impeded  by  the  inherent 
transaction costs of contracting
40. 
Building on Jensen and Meckling’s view that the firm is a nexus of contracts, 
transaction-cost economics rendered the paradigm of incomplete contracting central in 
the  way  we  reflect  on  the  nature  of  the  firm  and  its  governance  structure.  As  Luigi 
Zingales puts it: 
Only in a world where some contracts contingent on future observable 
variables are costly (or impossible) to write ex-ante, is there room for 
governance ex-post. Only in such a world, are there quasi-rents that 
must be divided ex-post and real decisions that must be made … only in 
                                                 
35  Christine  Jolls  et  al.,  A  Behavioral  Approach  to  Law  and  Economics,  in  BEHAVIORAL  LAW  & 
ECONOMICS (C. SUNSTEIN) (2000), 14 
36  “Bounded  rationality”  is  a  term  attributed  to  Herbert  Simon,  who  defines  it  as  behavior  that  is 
“intendedly rational, but only limitedly so”, see HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1961) p. 
xxxiv  
37 The cognitive assumption of bounded rationality on which transaction-cost economics rely is another 
pillar  by  which  the  theory  of  the  firm  put  forward  by  this  school  of  thought  is  distinguished  by  the 
neoclassical approach to the firm.  
38 Lenoble, supra note 20, 20  
39 Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 473, 473  
40 Robert Scott & George Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE 
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW 187, 190    15 
a  world  of  incomplete  contracts  can  we  define  what  a  firm  is  and 
discuss corporate governance.
41 
 In other words, incomplete contracts are what give rise to the need for corporate 
governance
42.  Incomplete  contracting  acts  as  a  determinant  of  corporate  governance 
mechanisms, in the sense that the latter are a response to contractual design exigencies; 
they are devices used to mitigate contractual impasses
43 and to reduce the risks associated 
with incomplete knowledge. Understanding the factors that impact contract design means 
understanding the factors that shape corporate governance. 
Although  “incompleteness  of  contracts”  has  become  a  terminus  technicus  of 
contract theory conveying the impossibility of accommodating all future eventualities in 
a contract, I argue here that, when this term is used within the analytical framework of the 
theory of the firm, it should be given a broader meaning; it should be used so as to 
include all the implicit challenges of contracting between the financiers of the firm and 
the managers and not only the unforeseeability of future eventualities. “Incompleteness” 
should incorporate not only the problem of unpredictable future variables, but also the 
incentive  problems,  to  which  agency  theory  points,  as  well  as  additional  contractual 
hazards that transaction-cost economics identifies. To make things clear, I will hence 
refer  to  contract  theory’s  traditional  notion  of  incompleteness  as  “stricto  sensu 
incompleteness” and to the sum of intrinsic problems that contracting between financiers 
and managers has as “lato sensu incompleteness”.  
                                                 
41 Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW (P. NEWMAN ed., 1998) 497, 503 
42  See  Andrei  Shleifer  &  Robert  Vishny,  supra  note  34;  Jean  Tirole,  Corporate  Governance,  69 
ECONOMETRICA 1  
43 Oliver Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 171, 174    16 
Under this terminological distinction, stricto sensu incompleteness will be treated 
merely as one of the many conundrums that the principal-agent contract must address; in 
other words as one of the dimensions of the lato sensu incompleteness of contracts.  
The construction of this new term will also help me to convey more efficiently a 
significant point that I am trying to make in the following section: agency theory and 
transaction-cost economics although customarily considered as two distinct approaches to 
the theory of the firm are in essence complementary and the problems that they identify 
with  regard  to  the  contract,  which  underlies  the  organization  of  a  firm,  can  be 
accommodated under a single broad sense of incompleteness. 
C. The Dimensions of the Lato Sensu Incompleteness of Contracts as Determinants 
of Corporate Governance 
1. Moral Hazard Costs and Post-Contractual Opportunism 
If one skims treatises and articles listing the different theories that have been put 
forward to describe the nature of the firm, it won’t be difficult to identify that transaction-
cost economics and agency theory are traditionally classified as two distinct approaches 
to the theory of the firm
44. However, this taxonomy comes as a surprise, if one takes 
under account the contractarian basis of both schools of thought that we described above. 
The actual convergence of the two theories is more evident, if we also consider the main 
concerns that they express with regard to the organization within a firm.  
 Agency theory develops a theory of contracts in cases, which are characterized 
by asymmetric information and by a divergence of incentives between the parties. The 
foremost agency problem, with which proponents of this theory are concerned, is the one 
                                                 
44 See e.g. OLIVER HART, FIRMS CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995), 15ff.   17 
that governs the relationship between the capital suppliers of the firm and the managers; a 
problem  that  derives  from  the  separation  of  management  and  finance
45.  As  in  every 
agency relationship, the contractual relationship between the financiers of the firm (the 
principals) and the managers (the agents) is characterized by three essential elements:  
(i)  The objectives of the principal and the agent do not concur, in the sense 
that they have different utility functions; thus, the maximization of each one’s 
utility depends on the undertaking of different actions and the making of different 
decisions. 
(ii)  The principal and the agent have different attitudes toward risk; they may 
prefer different actions because of their different risk preferences (the problem of 
“risk sharing”)
46. 
(iii)  It is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is 
actually doing and if she behaves appropriately. Due to asymmetry of information 
individual actions cannot be easily observed
47. 
These elements create a problem that is more broadly known as “moral hazard”
48. 
In essence, the greatest part of the so-called “agency costs” are moral hazard costs
49. 
                                                 
45 Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 34, 740.  
46 Robert Wilson, The Structure of Incentives for Decentralization under Uncertainty, in LA DÉCISION: 
AGGRÉGATION  ET DYNAMIQUE  DES ORDRES  DE PREFERENCE (G. GUILBAUD ed.,1969) 287, 287; Hayne 
Leland,  Optimal  Risk  Sharing  and  the  Leasing  of  Natural  resources  with  Application  to  Oil  and  Gas 
Leasing on the OCS, 92 QUARTERLY JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 413, 418; Stephen Ross, The Economic 
Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 134, 134 
47 Bengt Homstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 74, 74  
48 Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information, 20 JOURNAL OF 
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49 Michael Jensen & Clifford Smith, Stockholder, Manager and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency 
Theory, in  RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE (E. ALTMAN & M. SUBRAHMANYAM eds., 1985)   18 
Therefore, when agency theory states that a corporate governance institution should be 
conducive for reducing agency costs, it means that a governance structure should help 
alleviate the moral hazard problem that governs the relationship between the financiers of 
the firm and the managers. Institutions of corporate governance should reduce the range 
of actions, for which the capital suppliers have disutility while the managers have utility, 
by generating an optimal incentive scheme. 
Transaction-cost  economics,  apart  from  the  problem  of  stricto  sensu 
incompleteness,  lay  traditionally  emphasis  on  the  problem  of  post-contractual 
opportunistic  behavior
50.  Contracts  are  not  always  honored  by  the  parties  and  in  the 
presence of appropriable quasi-rents the possibility of opportunistic behavior is very real. 
Transaction-cost economists claim that dealing with the problem of “jockeying” over 
quasi-rents will be done at less cost if done through vertical integration, namely within a 
firm, rather than through market contracting. However, given the contractual basis of the 
firm,  transferring  quasi-rents  from  the  contractual  relationships  of  the  conventional 
market  inside  the  firm  will  not  completely  eliminate  the  problem  of  opportunistic 
behavior.  The  firm,  as  a  nexus  of  contracts,  will  keep  on  generating  quasi-rents  and 
corporate governance institutions will be used to constrain opportunism and shape the ex-
post bargaining over these rents
51. 
                                                 
95; Stephen Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The principal’s problem, 63 AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW 134 
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If closely examined, the hazard of opportunism that transaction-cost economics 
focus on is not different in substance to moral hazard, on which agency theory focuses
52. 
The only difference seems to be in terms of the perspective of the problem: agency theory 
examines  the  problem  of  the  relationship  between  the  financiers  of  the  firm  and  the 
managers  from  an  ex  ante  incentive-alignment  point  of  view,  while  transaction-cost 
economics  are  more  concerned  with  establishing  ex  post  governance  mechanisms
53, 
which will mitigate the adverse effects of the suboptimal structure of the initial contract. 
In both cases, however, we are discussing the design of mechanisms that will help the 
members of the firm surpass the inherent problems of the underlying contracts that they 
have  entered  into.  Agency  theory  will  focus  more  on  the  design  of  “preventive” 
measures,  while  transaction-cost  economics  will  lay  emphasis  more  on  the  design  of 
“repressive” measures.  
The  bottom  line,  however,  is  that  both  moral  hazard  costs  and  the  hazard  of 
opportunism are dimensions of the same lato sensu incompleteness of contracts, so that 
this very attribute of contracts can be thought of as driving the establishment and design 
of a great deal of institutions of corporate governance. Without corporate governance 
market players would have no way to fend off the cognitive chaos that would derive from 
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the  first.  The  mechanism  is  essentially  an  information  report  by  the  agent  to  the  principal.  In  this 
framework, the design of corporate governance mechanisms is a sub-category of the general mechanism 
design,  on  which  game  theory  discourses  focus;  see  ERIC  RASMUSEN,  GAMES  AND  INFORMATION:  AN 
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (2001) 240ff.   20 
the uncertainties that are associated with the incompleteness of contracts
54. As it will 
become evident in the third part of this paper, many of the provisions found in venture 
capital  financing  contracts  essentially  attempt  to  establish  a  corporate  governance 
mechanism  that  will  address  the  problem  of  moral  hazard,  which  the  contractual 
relationship between the start-up firm and the venture capitalist (henceforth: VC) would 
otherwise generate. 
2. Adverse Selection 
The main cause of moral hazard is asymmetric information during the period, in 
which a contract governs a relationship. However, apart from moral hazard, economists 
refer to a second type of agency problem known as adverse selection, which stems from 
asymmetric information prior to entering into a contract
55. Adverse selection is a problem 
particularly associated with VC financing. 
While  moral  hazard  derives  from  the  agent’s  hidden  action,  adverse  selection 
stems from the agent’s hidden information. The agent knows more about her ability than 
the principal does at the time of contracting, just like the seller of a product may know 
more  about  the  quality  of  the  item  she  sells  than  the  buyer.  The  principal  has  thus 
imperfect information about the agent’s innate work disutility and therefore within the 
framework of a firm it might be difficult to hire only managers with high ability
56. In the 
absence of mechanisms that can help distinguish high-ability managers from low-ability 
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managers it will be in the interest of the latter to withhold information about their skills
57. 
Corporate  governance  institutions  can  help  to  structure  schemes  that  will  incentivize 
potential managers to signal their ability to the principals prior to entering the contract, so 
that the pooling problem can be tackled
58. 
In start-up firms that seek financing, a variation of the adverse selection problem 
appears, where the entrepreneur has better information about the profitability and the 
prospects of the existing firm, than VCs do
59. In subsequent parts of this paper (II and 
III.B.5) I will examine how VCs screen entrepreneurs and deal with this idiosyncratic 
agency  problem.  The  take-away  for  the  moment  from  this  brief  presentation  of  the 
adverse selection problem is that it is another challenge of contracting, another dimension 
of  the  lato  sensu  incompleteness  of  contracts  and  hence  also  drives  the  design  of 
corporate governance mechanisms.  
3. Stricto Sensu Incompleteness of Contracts 
As it was noted earlier in this chapter, transaction-cost economics have as their 
starting point the stricto sensu incompleteness of contracts: parties to a contract cannot 
possibly lay out all future contingencies and hence the contract will remain incomplete 
(see I.B). This dimension of the inherent problems of contracts has not been adequately 
emphasized by the prevalent approach to the theory of the firm, which constrains its 
discourse  to  incentive  (agency)  problems.  Nonetheless,  the  mere  fact  that  future 
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eventualities  cannot  be  foreseen  within  the  scope  of  the  initial  contract  between  the 
financiers  of  the  firm  and  the  managers  is  in  reality  one  of  the  most  significant 
determinants of corporate governance design. Over the past twenty years the so-called 
“financial contracting literature”
60 has tried to integrate this factor in the discourse of the 
theory of the firm by focusing on how decision-control rights should be allocated among 
the members of a firm. 
Agency  theory  has  gone  to  great  lengths  to  establish  a  comprehensive  theory 
about the firm based on the problem of asymmetric information. Although the conflict of 
interests  between  the  capital  suppliers  of  the  firm  and  the  managers  has  significant 
influence in the way corporate contractual packages are designed, it does not provide us 
with  the  complete  picture  about  the  limitations  that  these  two  parties  face  when 
contracting. The problem is that by focusing exclusively on this viewpoint of the conflict 
between the investors and the manager we take as granted that the relationship between 
the two is static, in the sense that, no matter what the circumstances are, the manager will 
act  in  a  specific  way  that  is  contrary  to  the  utility  of  the  investors.  However,  the 
relationship between the manager and the financiers of the firm is actually dynamic
61; the 
nature and type of the conflict of interest between the two parties is subject to alterations 
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depending  on  the  ever-changing  states  of  the  world  and  on  unexpected  eventualities. 
Therefore, provisions in the initial contract that, based on the remarks of agency theory, 
attempt to align the incentives of the two parties (: corporate governance mechanisms) 
cannot be expected to work in all possible future contingencies. Important new decisions, 
whose timing and nature is unknown during the draft of the initial contract, must be taken 
in  response  to  these  eventualities,  since  the  incentive-alignment  scheme  put  forward 
under  the  original  contractual  package  might  not  be  the  optimal  under  the  new 
circumstances.  Incentive  schemes,  although  they  aspire  to  be  comprehensive,  cannot 
possibly  be  “one-size-fits-all”.  Therefore,  as  Hart  puts  it  “…although  the  contracting 
parties cannot specify what decisions should be made as a function of (impossible) hard-
to-anticipate-and-describe  future  contingencies,  they  can  choose  a  decision-making 
process in advance”
62. In other words, non-conceivable eventualities create the need to 
design  institutions  that  will  allocate  decision-making  power  over  future  strategic 
decisions among the members of the firm. Consequently, stricto sensu incompleteness of 
contracts adds another issue in the design of the corporate contract, another challenge for 
the design of corporate governance institutions: how should residual rights of control –
“defined as rights to decide between different transactions in contingencies left out of the 
initial contract”
63- be allocated among the members of the firm
64? Which mechanisms 
should be used to ensure that the key corporate decisions under future states of the world 
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will  be  made  by  the  party  to  the  contract  that  has  the  optimal  incentives  given  the 
circumstances? 
As it will be shown later in this paper (III.C) the issue of allocation of control 
rights among the members of the firm is of extreme importance in the highly uncertain 
and  ever-changing  environment  of  VC  financings.  In  an  uncertain  economic 
environment, where the ability to adjust is a valuable asset by itself, the specification of 
the authority over key corporate decisions is a vital issue. For the moment though, the 
take-away  is  that  the  way  decision  power  is  allocated  within  a  firm  is  of  great 
significance for the design of this firm’s governance structure. 
 
II. Screening Private Information: How VCs Deal With Adverse Selection 
 
A. The Theory of Financial Intermediation and Venture Capital 
As it became evident in the previous chapter, informational asymmetries have a 
dominant position in the discourse about the design of financial contracts and governance 
institutions.  This  comes  as  no  surprise  to  those  who  are  familiar  with  the  theory  of 
strategic interactions, since most real world situations are indeed games of incomplete 
rather  than  complete  information.  However,  in  the  financial  market  informational 
asymmetries are much more intensely pronounced than in other situations where rational 
players  with  private  information  interact
65.  As  far  as  public  financial  markets  are 
concerned, securities regulation determines how parties share information with each other 
and  thus  -to  a  certain  extent-  regulation  mitigates  the  problems  caused  by  these 
                                                 
65  Hayne  Leland  &  David  Pyle,  Informational  Asymmetries,  Financial  Structure  and  Financial 
Intermediation, 32 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 371, 371    25 
asymmetries. But, in the world of private financing companies are not obliged by legal 
rules  to  publish  any  information  to  potential  financiers.  Apparently,  entrepreneurs 
seeking financing will be de facto required to disclose information, but still the absence 
of a mandatory disclosure regime preserves a high level of costly market imperfections 
and creates an environment of uncertainty. The result is a market structure that is far from 
being ideal according to the Arrow-Debreu model, where full information prevails
66. The 
more  a  market  departs  from  this  theoretical  benchmark,  the  more  prone  to  failure  it 
becomes
67.  Without  a  device  that  would  produce  and  transfer  information  from  the 
entrepreneurs to investors, the venture capital markets may fail to exist
68. 
Where many entrepreneurs seek financing at the same time, the investors cannot 
discriminate  between  good  and  bad  projects.  The  entrepreneurs  know  their 
industriousness, moral rectitude and the quality of their projects, but the investors do not 
possess  that  information.  In  a  pool  of  projects  that  seek  financing  there  will  be 
necessarily high quality and low quality projects. The entrepreneurs have the incentive to 
overstate  the  favorable  aspect  of  the  project,  while  downplaying  the  negatives,  thus 
essentially leading to a situation where all entrepreneurs claim that their project is of high 
quality
69. Since the investors cannot discern the high quality projects from the low quality 
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projects, the best they can do is to offer to invest at a price that reflects the average 
quality of the pool
70; interest rates (if the investment is made through debt instruments) or 
the portion of the profits asked in exchange (if the investment is made through equity 
instruments) will be adjusted to the average quality of the pool
71. Demanding yields for a 
project of only average quality will result in high cost of capital for entrepreneurs, who 
have high quality projects
72; high quality projects essentially take the biggest discount, 
when the investors discount the stream of benefits for the probability that they will not 
materialize
73. As a result high quality entrepreneurs will withdraw from the pool and 
gradually only bad quality projects (“lemons”)
74 will be left for financing
75. 
 The  pool  price  effectively  subsidizes  low  quality  and  penalizes  high  quality 
projects.  This  problem  exists  in  every  investment  environment,  but  seems  to  be 
particularly acute in entrepreneurial finance. Start-up firms are young and volatile with 
no track record that would provide information about their potential
76 and often with no 
assets  at  all  that  could  serve  as  collateral.  These  attributes  make  the  effects  of 
informational market failures more severe in entrepreneurial finance than in the financing 
of established firms. Therefore, this market is in dire need of an agent that will produce 
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information about the qualities of the projects
77 and will transfer it, so as to bridge some 
of the informational asymmetry that exists between entrepreneurs and investors.  
Information production is deemed to be a sufficient condition for the emergence 
of  financial  intermediaries
78  that  will  be  delegated  the  costly  tasks  of  screening  and 
monitoring investments
79. Financial intermediaries attenuate the informational obstacles 
by taking advantage of economies of specialization and scale
80. The company research 
and  the  monitoring  that  intermediaries  undertake  is  centralized  and  thus  the  costs 
associated with decentralization that would exist, if individual investors had to perform 
these tasks, are significantly reduced. Therefore, for these activities intermediaries are 
said to have a comparative net cost advantage
81. 
In  the  entrepreneurial  finance  world  venture  capital  funds  perform  this 
intermediary function and thus improve allocational efficiency
82.  Through the use of 
debt, equity or hybrid securities they make capital and professional services available to 
firms  that  might  otherwise  be  excluded  from  other  sources  of  private  finance
83. 
Universally, there are four main types of venture capital funds: small business investment 
companies  (SBICs),  financial  VC  funds,  corporate  VC  funds  and  VC  limited 
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which the venture capital investor acquires, by agreement, a proportion of the share capital in the business 
in return for providing funding”; see GAVIN REID, VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT: AN AGENCY ANALYSIS 
OF PRACTICE (1998), 15    28 
partnerships
84.  In  the  US  the  prevalent  type  of  organization  for  funds  is  the  limited 
partnership
85. Under the partnership agreement a VC firm, more often referred to as the 
“venture  capitalist”,  acts  as  the  general  partner,  while  individual  and  institutional 
investors  invest  in  the  partnership  as  limited  partners.  Investment  and  monitoring 
decisions are delegated to the VC, who has significant discretion over the funds of the 
partnership
86.  Usually  the  partnership  agreement  does  not  allow  the  fund  to  reinvest 
profits or issue debt
87; this effectively leads to the so-called “venture capital cycle”
88, 
which means that capital is first raised, then invested and in the end returned to the 
investors.  This  cycle  differentiates  VC  funds  as  financial  intermediaries  from  other 
information production devices such as banks, which raise, invest and return capital all at 
the  same  time
89.  The  structure  and  organization  of  VC  funds  features  many  of  the 
traditional incentive and incomplete contracting problems that were touched upon in the 
previous chapter. Their analysis though is beyond the scope of the current paper, which is 
primarily concerned with the contract between the VC and the start-up firm and not with 
the (distinct) contract between the investors of the VC fund and the venture capitalist
90. 
Nonetheless, whenever the content of the contract between the investors of the VC fund 
                                                 
84 Joseph McCahery & Luc Renneboog, Venture Capital Financing of Innovative Firms: An Introduction, 
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L. RENNEBOOG eds., 2003), 5  
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87 PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (1999), 38  
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89  Georg  Gebhardt,  A  Soft  Budget  Constraint  Explanation  for  the  Venture  Capital  Cycle,  10  GERMAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 71, 72   
90 For an overview of the rights and obligations of each group that are spelled out in the partnership 
agreement that establishes the VC fund see William Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-
Capital Organizations, 27 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 473, 489ff.   29 
and the VC firm affects the contract between the latter and the start-up firm there will be 
special reference in the text. 
B. The Staged Investment of Venture Capital 
1. Integrating Governance Design into the Screening Game 
A flashback to Part I would remind us that corporate governance institutions are 
put in place to deal with the dimensions of the incompleteness of the contract between the 
members of a firm. Corporate governance mechanisms provide a governing framework 
for  pursuing  strategic  objectives  and  economic  tasks  that  might  otherwise  prove 
unfeasible. Without these institutions it would be impossible for the suppliers of finance 
to corporations to assure themselves of getting a return on their investment
91. Whether 
these  institutions  will  attain  their  goal  or  not,  depends  not  only  on  giving  the  right 
incentives to the manager (for our purposes to the entrepreneur), but also on choosing the 
right  entrepreneur  since  the  very  beginning
92.  Therefore,  the  browse  for  the  most 
effective process of screening entrepreneurs, with whom the VC is going to enter into a 
contractual relationship, is essentially a reflection on the design of another governance 
institution. The need for screening derives from the need to deal with the problem of 
adverse  selection,  yet  another  dimension  of  the  incompleteness  of  contracts.  Since 
                                                 
91 Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 34, 737 define corporate governance as the ways, in which financiers 
make  sure  that  they  will  get  a  return  on  their  investment.  This  could  be  considered  as  a  teleological 
definition  for  corporate  governance,  namely  a  definition  that  focuses  on  the  ultimate  purpose  of  this 
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ECONOMICS (C. MENARD & M. SHIRLEY eds., 2008), 373    30 
incompleteness is the driving force behind all institutions of corporate governance in 
private companies, it follows that the screening mechanism is itself such an institution.  
The  challenge  for  the  VC  in  the  design  of  this  mechanism  is  to  obtain  the 
unraveling of infromation; the mechanism should be calculated to result in the disclosure 
of the entrepreneurs’ private information about the quality of their project
93. The VC 
should  always  have  in  mind  that  the  courtship  with  the  entrepreneur  is  essentially  a 
screening game, as game theory puts it; the informed player, the entrepreneur, moves 
second and always in response to contracts offered by the uninformed player, the VC
94. 
 In economics literature it has been repeatedly postulated that a mandatory legal 
rule that would compel a disclosure on behalf of the informed party is all that is needed to 
ensure that the unraveling result will occur
95. Nonetheless, in our case the entrepreneurs 
possess private nonverifiable information, which means that, even if the information is 
revealed, neither the VC nor any third party, such as a court, has a direct way of checking 
the truthfulness of the disclosure
96. In these situations information is best conveyed by 
self-selection
97, namely on the basis of inferences drawn by observing the actions of the 
entrepreneur. Where a simple message would not work, a signal does work; actions speak 
louder  than  words
98.  Therefore,  what  the  VC  should  do  is  find  a  way  to  induce  the 
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entrepreneurs to signal their ability and the quality of their projects; to convey the private 
information by means of their actions.  
The mechanism that is usually used by VCs, in order to induce the signaling on 
behalf of the entrepreneurs is staggered financing or else staged investment. The amount 
of  the  initial  investment  is  usually  small  (seed  capital)  and  additional  investments 
(development, start-up and expansion financing prior to going public
99) are contingent on 
observable measures of financial and non-financial performance
100. Staggered financing 
allows the VC to reserve an exit option and provide its investment with a “wait-and-see” 
flexibility
101. The higher the risk of the start-up firm, the higher the value of this option 
for the VC
102. The investment decision is delayed for future points, where the level of 
certainty  about  the  future  prospects  of  the  firm  increases.  The  VC  periodically 
reevaluates the prospects of the firm and reserves the right to either further invest in the 
project, if it thinks that it is in its interest or discontinue the financing
103. Venture capital 
staged investment is a good example of a partial equilibrium model that is embedded in a 
                                                 
99 Seed capital is the initial investment of a small sum in the entrepreneur who has an attractive idea; the 
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Bayesian universe, where parties have an initial “malleable” belief on the information 
they do not possess and they revise it as the interaction with the entrepreneur unfolds
104. 
Before examining the screening function of staged investment, we should first 
touch upon another reason that purports to affect the decision of the vast majority of VC 
firms to stage the infusion of their capital in the entrepreneurial firms
105. 
2. Real Options Theory and Staged Investment 
Investing in a start-up firm is highly uncertain. Usually the value of such firms is 
locked in growth options
106 and with the standard Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) analysis 
they might appear to have a negative present value (NPV). A negative NPV, though, 
suggests that the VC should not make the investment in the project at all. If this is the 
case,  why  would  a  rational  VC  ever  provide  financing  to  a  start-up  firm?  Does 
investment-decision  making  in  the  VC  industry  indeed  rely  on  traditional  DCF 
valuations?  
The traditional DCF has lost its popularity as a project selection criterion
107. VCs 
have turned to options thinking, so as to capture the value of managerial flexibility in 
their valuation of a start-up firm. DCF is a static method of financial valuation and is 
unable to accommodate the flexibility that the start-up firm will obtain, when the VC will 
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infuse it with active management
108. Options thinking creates a fertile ground for a more 
dynamic approach to the financial valuation of start-up firms that will emphasize the total 
strategic value of an entrepreneurial project and will not let short-term negative cash 
flows deter the investment. By quantifying the value of managerial flexibility in a world 
of  uncertainty  this  new  method  of  financial  valuation  allows  the  VC  to  view  its 
engagement with the entrepreneur not as a one-time investment, but as a relationship that 
might  give  rise  to  upside  opportunities.  These  opportunities  should  be  treated  as 
corporate real options
109, namely as rights to proceed with (the option of expanding the 
investment), terminate (the option to discontinue the investment in midstream), or revise 
the future investment plans. As more information are revealed due to the progress of the 
project, the VC can decide whether it will exercise the right to continue or terminate the 
investment. An investment move that creates such rights should be given a higher value 
than the traditional net present value approach would suggest
110. Even investments with 
negative NPV might end up being beneficial to undertake, if the option values are valued 
properly. 
Real  options  theory  with  its  financial  valuation  method  allows  for  strategic 
adaptability  and  is  thus  superior  to  traditional  DCF  analysis  in  settings  of  extreme 
uncertainty. This makes it conducive to innovative industries, in which the vast majority 
of VC firms choose to invest. Real options theory emphasizes the contingent feature of 
the VC investment and thus, if followed, it induces the VC at the time of the pre-money 
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valuation
111 and of the investment decision to stagger the financing to the entrepreneurial 
firm.  In  other  words,  real  options  theory  as  a  concept  and  as  a  method  of  financial 
valuation presupposes the staging of the investment. Without staged investment there 
would be no options to value and the only financial valuation method would be DCF, 
which would show most start-up firms as having a negative NPV, thus discouraging any 
kind of VC investment.  
3. Staged Investment as a Screening Strategy 
i. The traditional view of staged financing as a monitoring device 
Staging the commitment of capital in a start-up firm can indeed be a very efficient 
control mechanism. When the VC sets performance milestones that the entrepreneur has 
to obtain, in order for the financing to proceed to the next stage, a strong incentive device 
is  in  place  that  can  help  confront  the  “shirking”  problem  in  the  agency  relationship 
between  the  VC  firm  and  the  entrepreneur
112.  This  is  why  staged  capital  infusion  is 
believed
113 to be serving a disciplining function equivalent to that of debt in the public 
firm setting
114. In addition to this, experimental game theory has showed that in a labor 
relation repeated interaction with the same player increases effort levels as compared to 
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one-shot interactions
115. Sequential financing rounds allow for this repeated interaction to 
emerge and thus give space for this kind of result to be realized.  
Although, traditionally, venture capital literature views staged investment as a 
monitoring device conducive to deal with the problem of moral hazard costs
116, I argue 
here that it should also be viewed as a screening strategy that withstands the adverse 
selection problem. 
 The default argument of those who concur with this view is that making finance 
contingent  on  a  performance  milestone  will  deter  an  entrepreneur  with  a  low-quality 
project to approach the VC
117. Inserting this contingency in the financing contract shifts 
the risk of failure from the VC to the entrepreneur and it would thus be “foolish for 
entrepreneurs to accept such contract terms, if they were not truly confident of their own 
abilities and deeply committed in the venture”
118. It is well substantiated in corporate 
theory that a party’s agreement to assume a risk signals this party’s private information 
about the probability and the severity of the risk
119. 
ii. A behavioral approach to staged investment: Looking for entrepreneurial intrinsic 
motivation 
 
While  the  aforementioned  arguments  are  plausible,  I  argue  that  by  using  a 
behavioral  approach  to  the  entrepreneur’s  decision-making  process  in  applying  for 
financing, one can understand better why staged investment serves as a screening tool.  
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Neoclassical economic models assume that people dislike working and thus have 
a tendency to shirk
120; therefore the only way to induce them to expend effort is by 
providing  them  with  extrinsic  incentives,  such  as  monetary  rewards
121.  However, 
empirical surveys show that pecuniary compensation is not of the greatest importance to 
workers and that people undertake certain activities because of intrinsic motivation and 
without  expecting  an  extrinsic  reward
122.  Intrinsic  motivation  pushes  employees  to 
expend more effort in their work than required
123. In the human resources literature it has 
been claimed that excessive compensations and incentive payment schemes can seriously 
undermine a worker’s intrinsic motivation
124, which seems to be the foremost element 
that empowers production.  
In the venture capital world there are two categories of entrepreneurs: those who 
are motivated and will pursue their project because they see intrinsic benefits in it and 
those  who  do  not  derive  intrinsic  utility  from  working  on  the  project,  but  would  be 
willing  to  pursue  it,  if  they  had  sufficient  extrinsic  rewards.  According  to  the 
aforementioned empirical studies the former category of entrepreneurs is more likely to 
expend  greater  effort  when  working  on  the  project,  while  entrepreneurs  in  the  latter 
category are undertaking the project more because of the pecuniary reward and less for 
the job satisfaction. Obviously, it is in the interest of the VC to sign a financing contract 
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with  the  intrinsically  motivated  entrepreneurs  rather  than  with  those  who  will  only 
respond to the money offer. The structure of a staged “back-end loaded” investment is 
conducive to discourage the low motivated entrepreneurs from approaching the VC, since 
at  first  sight  such  an  investment  does  not  appear  to  include  a  sufficient  extrinsic 
reward
125. Thus, staggered financing that starts with a small capital infusion in the first 
round, but gradually increases as the venture meets performance milestones, can serve as 
a screening device inducing low motivated entrepreneurs to withdraw from the pool. 
Intrinsically motivated entrepreneurs with a capability of greater production signal their 
motivation by staying in the pool and thus VCs can successfully overcome the adverse 
selection problem simply via the terms of the financial contract they offer. 
iii. The problem of “soft-budget constraints” 
Although the aforementioned screening strategy might seem to work perfectly 
well in terms of dealing with the adverse selection problem, a certain fraction of the 
economic literature would suggest that it fails to do so due to the so-called “soft-budget 
constraint” syndrome. The term was coined by Janos Kornai within the scope of the study 
of  the  economic  behavior  in  socialist  economies
126,  where  loss-making  enterprises
127 
were being consistently refinanced despite the obvious inefficiency associated with this 
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practice
128.  Despite  its  intellectual  origins  the  concept  of  soft-budget  constraints  has 
become pertinent in microeconomic theory as well
129. It refers to the dynamic incentive 
problem  of  a  funding  source  that  cannot  credibly  commit  at  the  time  of  the  initial 
investment not to refinance a failing company
130. 
Here is how the soft-budget constraint syndrome works: A funding source (e.g. 
the government or a bank) agrees to finance an organization (e.g. a utilities enterprise or a 
firm) that needs capital to sustain its operations. In order to induce the managers of the 
funded organization to expend optimal effort, the funding source commits not to provide 
further financing after the initial investment, if the organization fails to produce the cash 
flows that will assure a return on the source’s investment. However, when the funded 
firm ultimately fails to provide a return on the investment, the funding source is tempted 
to refinance the firm despite the failure
131. As a rational agent the source knows that the 
initial investment, which produced a zero payoff
132, is now a sunk cost
133, namely a cost 
that  cannot  be  recovered  once  incurred.  If  operations  of  the  funded  firm  were 
discontinued, then this investment would certainly be lost forever
134; the only chance to 
recoup and salvage
135 this past investment is to refinance the failed firm, because then the 
payoff might be positive. In other words, the only way the funding source can be better 
                                                 
128 GUN ERIKSSON SKOOG, THE SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT: THE EMERGENCE, PERSISTENCE AND LOGIC OF 
AN INSTITUTION (2000), 2; Janos Kornai et al., Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint, 41 JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 1095, 1096  
129 Id. at 1095 
130 Dewatripont & Roland, supra note 127, 246; Kornai et al., supra note 128, 1099  
131 Dewatripont & Roland, supra note 127, 246  
132 Kornai et al., supra note 128, 1108  
133 Dewatripont & Roland, supra note 127, 246  
134 Kornai et al., supra note 128, 1099   
135 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 87, 38    39 
off given the situation is by refinancing the firm
136. It is often better to attempt a turn-
around by means of a follow-on financing than simply to cut losses by terminating the 
investment
137. There is, thus, ex post an irresistible force that pushes the financier to 
essentially bailout the financed firm. The funding source is averse to liquidation and 
would prefer to renegotiate the terms of financing
138. 
Therefore, from an ex ante point of view it is in the interest of the funding source 
to commit not to continue the financing, if the firm proves to be a bad investment. From 
an ex post perspective, however, the only rational decision for the funding source is to 
refinance  the  failed  firm
139.  This  divergence  of  the  ex  ante  and  ex  post  perspectives 
results  in  the  funding  source’s  inability  to  credibly  commit  at  the  time  of  the  initial 
investment to discontinue the financing in case the firm fails. The threat of termination 
would deter managers of firms with poor prospects to approach the funding source for 
financing, but given that no such threat can credibly be declared, firms with low-quality 
projects will not withdraw from the pool of applicants for financing
140. 
The  soft-budget  constraint  variable  can  completely  alter  the  outcomes  of  the 
venture capital screening game that we modeled under II.B.3.iii. Entrepreneurs with poor 
motivation and low-quality projects would still approach the VC, since they know that a 
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rational  VC  would  not  ultimately  follow  the  initially  planned  structure  of  staged 
investment  and  terminate  the  financing  due  to  low  performance.  That  means  that 
entrepreneurs would no longer be subject to the negative payoff that liquidation would 
earn  them  after  the  termination  of  financing
141.  Consequently,  they  do  not  have  an 
incentive to withdraw from the pool and thus they nurture the adverse selection problem. 
Therefore the question arises: is there a governance mechanism, whose design can 
invalidate  the  soft-budget  constraint  problem  and  preserve  the  efficient  screening 
function of staggered financing? What corporate governance institution can put a hard 
budget constraint in place that will make poor quality entrepreneurs withdraw from the 
pool?  
iv. The VC partnership agreement as a hard budget constraint 
The corporate governance institution that introduces a hard budget constraint to 
the VC’s investment in a single start-up firm is not a creature of the contract between the 
VC firm and the entrepreneur, but of the contract between the VC firm and the limited 
partners of the VC fund. In other words, it is a mechanism that derives from a covenant 
of  the  VC  partnership  agreement.  Thus,  the  VC  fund’s  modus  operandi  indirectly 
contributes to the attainment of the VC firm’s screening strategic objective.  
Empirical research in the field of VC partnership agreements
142 has shown that 
there are restrictions on verifiable components of the inefficient behavior that VC firms 
can  develop  during  the  life  of  the  fund
143.  The  soft-budget  constraint  syndrome  is 
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addressed specifically by putting a cap in the amount that the VC fund can invest in a 
single venture
144. Usually, this limitation is expressed by means of a threshold in the 
percentage  of  the  committed  capital  (:  the  capital  invested  in  the  fund)  that  can  be 
invested in any one company
145.  
In addition to this, VC partnership agreements include provisions that govern the 
reinvestment of the profits of the fund. VC firms may not reinvest capital gains at their 
own  discretion;  most  of  the  time  they  are  required  to  distribute  them  to  the  fund 
investors
146. Reinvestment is often conditioned on the advisory board’s prior approval or 
is altogether prohibited after a certain date or after a certain percentage of the committed 
capital is already invested
147. The fund investors have an incentive to negotiate this kind 
of covenant with regard to the reinvestment of profits not only in order to introduce hard 
budget  constraints  in  the  fund’s  portfolio  management,  but  also  because  there  is  the 
possibility that the VC firm will want to reinvest in order to increase its management 
fees. The compensation structure of VC firms consists not only from carried interest (: a 
flat percentage of a fund’s profits on invested capital), but also from management fees 
that are calculated either on the basis of the value of committed capital or on the basis of 
the  value  of  managed  capital
148.  Especially,  in  the  latter  case  (managed  capital) 
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distributing  profits  will  reduce  the  management  fees
149;  thus,  the  VC  firm  normally 
would have the incentive not to distribute, but to reinvest the capital gains, so that these 
dollar amounts stay under management and can be taken under account for compensation 
calculation purposes. 
This  corporate  governance  structure  that  ensues  from  the  VC  partnership 
agreement  leads  indirectly  to  optimal  contracting  between  the  VC  firm  and  the 
entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs with low-quality projects will not count on the soft-budget 
problem of the VC and thus will prefer to withdraw from the pool of potential financing 
recipients. The VC partnership agreement, thus, becomes a determinant of the unraveling 
result  and  sets  an  organizational  constraint  that  renders  VC  funds  in  general  better 
positioned  as  financial  intermediaries  –than,  for  example,  banks-  to  fund  start-up 
companies. 
 
III.  Infusing  Governance  through  Security  Design:  Why  Convertible 
Preferred Stock? 
 
A. Venture Capital’s Investing Vehicle of Choice: Convertible Preferred Stock 
It is well documented in the theoretical
150 and empirical literature
151 on venture 
capital that the most commonly used type of security in US VC financing is convertible 
preferred stock. This is a remarkable pattern, since in other corporate finance contexts 
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convertible preferred stock seems to be a financial instrument in decline
152, just a small 
source of financing
153. It is also at odds with the trend in Canadian and European venture 
capital financing, where straight debt or straight equity
154 are equally important financial 
instruments for investing in start-up firms
155. 
Convertible preferred stock is a mode of senior participation that provides the VC 
with a claim on the returns of the start-up firm in the form of a cumulative dividend
156 
and  also  gives  it  the  option  to  convert  the  security  into  common  stock
157.  In  the 
standardized convertible preferred stock financing term sheets, that VCs commonly use, 
there are four essential characteristics attached to this type of security: (i) a dividend and 
liquidation  preference;  (ii)  a  redemption  right;  (iii)  convertibility;  and  (iv)  control 
rights
158. As it has been brilliantly noted, the combination of these elements in a single 
security creates a regime that could be summarized in the phrase “heads I win, tails you 
lose”
159; in other words, the VC manages to share in the upside of the investment, but 
also to get downside protection
160. 
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In  the  following  lines,  I  provide  a  brief  descriptive  overview  of  the 
aforementioned four fundamental elements of convertible preferred stock that VCs use, 
without yet touching upon the corporate governance implications of each element. The 
overview does not aspire to be comprehensive and analyze all possible variations of these 
four attributes, but instead presents the most common forms that the latter take in VC 
contractual packages.  
1. Dividend and Liquidation Preference 
A preferred stockholder may be granted a right to cumulative or non-cumulative 
dividend. Under a non-cumulative structure unpaid preferred dividends do not accrue, 
while under a cumulative structure missed dividend payments remain a liability of the 
issuer
161.  In  the  venture  capital  context  cumulative  structures  are  prevalent  when 
designing  convertible  preferred  stock
162,  which  means  that  if  the  firm  skips  dividend 
payments then any dividends to common shareholders will be paid only after the VC has 
received back the accrued dividends plus the current dividend
163. 
Apart from dividend preference, Kaplan’s & Strömberg’s seminal survey of the 
venture  capital  contracting  world
164  showed  that  212  out  of  the  213  rounds  of  VC 
financing that were studied featured some form of liquidation preference embedded in the 
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security issued to the VC
165. With such a preference the VC has a senior priority to all 
junior stockholders (the entrepreneur and the managers
166) in receiving the proceeds from 
an event of liquidation (merger, consolidation, change of control etc.) of the start-up 
firm
167. In other words, upon such an event the VC can recoup its investment before the 
entrepreneur receives anything from the value of the venture. With regard to this aspect 
convertible preferred stock held by VCs is a “debtlike”, fixed claim for the amount of the 
liquidation preference
168. To be more precise, VCs normally have a choice surrounding 
the liquidity event; they are entitled to whichever of the following two turns out to be the 
greater in monetary terms: (a) a multiple of the initial purchase price
169 of the preferred 
stock  augmented  with  the  additional  accruing,  cumulative  dividend
170;  or  (b)  the 
consideration available to them as common shareholders, if they select to convert the 
preferred stock to common
171.  
Although  regular  convertible  preferred  stock  is  sufficient  for  the  VC  to  take 
precedence over common stockholders in the event of a liquidation, a significant number 
of VCs bargain for an increased form of liquidation preference attached to a more exotic 
type  of  security:  the  participating  convertible  preferred  stock.  In  the  aforementioned 
study of Kaplan and Strömberg participating convertible preferred stock appears in 82 of 
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the 213 financing rounds
172. With the additional participation right, which is embedded in 
this kind of security, the VC may first receive the cumulative dividend to which it is 
entitled as a preferred shareholder and then “play again” in the remaining enterprise value 
by sharing in the residual proceeds of the liquidation on an “as-converted basis”
173. In 
other words, the VC does not have to choose between receiving the liquidation preference 
and converting its preferred stock to common, but can have the best of both worlds by 
first  receiving  the  principal  amount  of  the  preferred  stock  and  then  sharing  in  the 
distributions to the common shareholders on a pro rata basis, as if it were one of them
174. 
The VC can, thus, enjoy the benefits of converting to common stock without actually 
having to convert and hence loose its liquidation preference right
175. 
2. Redemption Rights 
The convertible preferred stock, participating or non-participating, that VCs use 
for  their  investments  in  start-up  firms  is  often  called  puttable  convertible  preferred 
because of the redemption right that is customarily attached to it
176. The VC can only 
realize on its investment upon a liquidity event, but due to provisions in the VC fund 
partnership agreement it cannot wait for such an event for an indefinite period of time; 
there  is  pressure  on  the  VC  firm  to  liquidate  the  investment  within  a  predetermined 
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period of time
177. Thus, the financial contract, embodied in the securities issued to the 
VC,  provides  the  latter  with  an  additional  safeguard  to  protect  its  interests
178;  an 
alternative exit strategy. If a liquidity event, such as an IPO or a trade sale, does not take 
place until a specific point in time (usually because the firm is performing poorly) the VC 
may put the convertible preferred back to the firm and cash out its investment at the 
liquidation preference amount
179 (the amount invested plus any cumulative dividends)
180. 
In other words, the put right provides the VC with guaranteed liquidity. With regard to 
this aspect convertible preferred stock features another “debtlike” characteristic, since the 
redemption of the VC’s claim resembles to the repayment of principal to the creditor at 
the maturity of a debt claim
181. 
The put right allows the VC to exit a so-called “living dead” investment, namely a 
self-sustaining firm, which nonetheless does not promise to yield the expected return at 
the end of the holding period
182. Without this exit option the VC would be locked into an 
illiquid investment. 
3. Convertibility 
Consistent with the “heads I win, tails you loose” theme that underlies the design 
of convertible preferred stock in VC financings, the VC not only wishes to be protected 
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in the downside, but it wants to be able to capture part of the venture’s upside gains
183. 
Pure preferred stock would prevent it from attaining the latter goal and hence customarily 
the VC puts a term in the financing contract, pursuant to which it has the option to 
convert its preferred shares into common shares. VCs have both automatic and voluntary 
conversion  rights
184.  In  the  majority  of  VC  financings  preferred  stock  automatically 
converts to common immediately before the closing of an underwritten IPO
185; in most 
cases, though, for this automatic conversion to occur, the IPO price is required to be a 
specified  multiple  of  the  venture’s  share  price  at  the  time  of  the  seed  financing.  In 
general, though, such conversion takes place at the option of the VC, usually upon the 
realization of a trade sale or the reach of a milestone in financial performance
186. 
Normally,  a  VC  financing  contract  will  contain  some  kind  of  anti-dilution 
protection with regard to the conversion price and ratio
187. Between the point of the seed 
financing and the time of –for instance- the IPO other issuances of preferred stock might 
take place and they will normally be either price-dilutive (when the financing occurs at 
reduced valuation) or equity-dilutive to the Series A preferred, which were issued to the 
seed financier
188. Therefore, provisions in the financing contract feature an adjustment 
formula that establishes a conversion ratio, which helps minimize the dilutive effect of 
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such  down-rounds
189.  These  mechanisms  subject  the  conversion  prices  and  ratios  on 
either a “ratchet” or “weighted-average” basis. In brief, the former technique allows the 
shares of the VC to be repriced on the basis of the pricing done by later financiers, so that 
the conversion ratio of the initial preferred shares can fall automatically to the exact 
lowest price at which the company issues new shares
190. This adjustment mechanism 
does not take into account the number of shares issued in subsequent financing rounds 
and thus ignores the real dilutive effect that new issuances have on Series A; even if a 
single  share  is  issued  in  Series  B,  the  “ratchet”  automatic  adjustment  will  occur
191. 
Contrarily, the weighted-average formula does allow for the actual impact of the newly 
issued shares on total capitalization to be taken into consideration when calculating the 
adjustment of the conversion rate and thus cares both about the price and the number of 
the shares issued in subsequent financing rounds
192; under this approach, the conversion 
price  per  Series  A  preferred  share  is  reduced  to  the  weighted-average  price  of  the 
securities issued
193. 
Anti-dilution provisions help VCs to be more certain of the amount that they are 
going to receive as a return on their investment in the venture, since in this way they can 
shield their investment from a decrease in economic value. Therefore, such contractual 
provisions combined with the liquidation preference and the redemption rights that often 
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accompany  VC  financing  convertible  preferred  stock  produce  a  debt-like  payoff 
structure
194. 
4. Control Rights 
As it was discussed in Part I (B.3) within the scope of the analysis of the stricto 
sensu  incompleteness  of  contracts,  the  allocation  of  control  rights  is  of  extreme 
importance  in  financing  contexts  that  are  characterized  by  severe  informational 
asymmetries, such as the one of the VC industry. In the empirical VC literature three 
types of rights fall under the term “control rights”: (i) voting rights; (ii) veto (or negative 
control) rights; and (iii) board rights
195. 
First, VCs typically receive voting rights computed on the basis of the number of 
common  shares,  which  they  would  hold  if  their  preferred  stock  were  converted  into 
common
196. Thus, VCs vote their preferred stock with the common shareholders on an 
as-converted basis
197. 
In addition to regular voting rights, VCs typically negotiate for veto rights over 
major  corporate  actions
198.  These  rights,  which  are  included  in  articles  of  the  firm’s 
charter known as “protective provisions”
199, provide the VC with the power to block key 
decisions, such as the sale of the company’s assets
200, the timing of the IPO
201 or any 
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amendments  to  the  charter  that  would  adversely  affect  its  privileges
202.  Protective 
provisions are articulated in a way that does not allow the company to proceed with a 
certain  transaction  before  the  consent  of  a  specified  percentage  of  the  preferred 
shareholders is expressly given
203. To be sure though, the VC being alone in the class of 
preferred shareholders enjoys automatically the statutory privileges of class voting that 
DGCL §242(b)(2) provides, even if there is no explicit provision in the contract with 
regard to veto rights. 
The extent of the VC’s control over the start-up company is a resultant not only of 
its voting rights, but also of its so-called “board rights”
204. A specific percentage of the 
board seats are reserved for or controlled by the VC, so that the latter is able to monitor 
more efficiently the firm’s operation
205. The explicit right of the VC to appoint a specific 
number of members in the board coupled with its de facto power to control the election of 
the  “independent  directors”  effectively  gives  it  the  power  to  actually  initiate  major 
corporate actions, such as trade sales and IPOs
206.  
B.  The  Theories  of  Capital  Structure  and  their  Application  in  VC  Financing: 
Governance Features of Convertible Preferred Stock I 
1.  Solving  the  Enigma  of  Convertible  Preferred;  Standardization,  Mimetic 
Isomorphism and Corporate Governance  
 
Delivering  the  foregoing  overview  of  the  unique  features  that  convertible 
preferred  stock  has  in  the  VC  context  was  feasible  because  of  the  large-scale 
standardization  of  VC  contracts  in  the  US.  As  a  general  matter,  the  phenomenon  of 
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standardization of the corporate documentation does provide a plausible explanation of 
why market participants choose one financial instrument over another. It is true that in 
this nexus of contracts that the modern corporation is, charters, bond indentures or loan 
agreements are often not tailored to the specific firm’s circumstances, but are picked from 
a variety of predetermined contractual packages that are easily adaptable for use in cases 
that  share  similar  characteristics
207.  Therefore,  it  is  likely  that  many  VCs  attach  the 
aforementioned attributes to the securities, with which they invest in start-up ventures, 
mainly because this is the way the VC industry works
208. In other words, the reason why 
these  patterns  are  observed  in  a  great  deal  of  VC  financing  rounds  could  be  what 
institutional theory calls “mimetic isomorphism”
209.  
While mimetic isomorphism and the correlative phenomenon of standardization 
provide a plausible explanation for the repetitive character of corporate finance patterns 
in the VC industry, they cannot explain why these patterns initially developed.  As it was 
noted  in  the  foregoing  analysis,  the  most  common  practical  justification  that  is  put 
forward  for  the  use  of  convertible  preferred  stock  by  VCs  is  that  it  provides  both 
downside protection and significant upside potential
210.  
Although  this  explanation  is  perfectly  plausible  and  captures  absolutely  the 
essence  of  a  VC  investment,  it  does  not  account  for  the  corporate  governance 
implications that the use of convertible preferred stock has for start-up firms. To shed 
light on this aspect of convertible preferred stock, I attempt in this section of the paper to 
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conceptually integrate the use of this financial instrument by VCs into the analytical 
framework of contract theory that I developed in Part I. To put it differently, my goal in 
the following analysis is to show that convertible preferred stock is another arrow in the 
quiver of a VC that helps it cope with the lato sensu incompleteness of contracts and as 
such it is in effect an additional apparatus for corporate governance design in start-up 
ventures. 
A  convenient  way  to  show  how  convertible  preferred  stock  operates  as  an 
additional corporate governance institution in VC-backed firms is by first reconciling its 
function with the axioms of the theories of capital structure that have been put forward in 
the corporate finance literature.   
2. The Modigliani-Miller Capital Structure Irrelevance Theorem and the Rise of the 
Capital Structure Debate 
 
The cornerstone of modern corporate finance literature and thinking on capital 
structure is the Modigliani-Miller theorem
211, which postulates: “in an ideal world, where 
there are no taxes, or incentive or information problems, the way a project or a firm is 
financed does not matter
212”. In other words, when markets are complete the type of 
securities issued is indifferent and not important for the success of the project or the 
firm
213;  the  value  of  the  firm  will  be  constant  across  all  financial  packages.  The 
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argumentum a contrario that derives from the Modigliani-Miller theorem is that in the 
real  world,  where  there  are  bankruptcy  costs,  informational  asymmetries  and  tax 
subsidies on the payment of interest, financial structure cannot be indifferent for a firm. 
Consequently, given the imperfection of markets, there will indeed be capital structures 
that will help the firm and its investors to maximize their utility and capital structures that 
might render the firm and its financiers worse off; there will be optimal and suboptimal 
capital structures
214. This hypothesis has led a great number of authors over the last thirty 
years to try to develop a theory of the determination of the optimal capital structure. 
 Several theories of capital structure emerged that attempted to resolve the puzzle 
of why firms obtain capital through the particular forms that were observed for such long 
periods  of  time.  Various  models  were  proposed  to  explain  the  driving  forces  behind 
capital  structure  patterns:  models  based  on  taxation  considerations,  on  differing 
expectations among investors
215, on private information
216, on incomplete markets and 
transaction costs
217, even models that focused on wealth constraints and the transfer of 
control in bankruptcy
218. 
 The common underlying theme of all the theories of capital structure was the 
effort to determine how to optimally partition the cash flows from the firm’s assets across 
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financial  claims  with  different  characteristics
219.  In  the  beginning,  these  theories 
constrained the scope of the capital structure decision by basing it on the dichotomous 
choice  between  debt  and  equity
220,  which  in  this  framework  were  both  viewed  as 
standardized, exogenously given securities
221. For a long period of time the financial 
structure  decision  was  simply  a  question  of  the  optimal  mix  of  traditional  debt  and 
equity
222.  Nonetheless,  the  development  of  financial  engineering  and  innovation
223 
softened  the  differentiation  between  the  two  paradigm  instruments  in  the  corporate 
finance  literature  and  demonstrated  that  corporate  securities  should  not  be  viewed  as 
necessarily  exogenous
224.  Financial  innovation  and  contracting  flexibility
225  indicated 
that firms can attain their financial and strategic goals not only by trying to compose the 
optimal  financial  package  through  the  choice  among  a  finite  array  of  exogenous 
instruments,  but  also  by  going  one  logical  step  back  in  the  financing  process  and 
endogenously  tailor  the  financial  contracts,  which  the  various  corporate  securities 
represent, so as to meet their needs
226. Especially, the emergence during the 80s of hybrid 
instruments, such as puttable common stock, puttable convertible bonds, adjustable rate 
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preferred stock
227, liquid yield option notes (LYONs)
228 etc., paved the way for firms to 
stop  struggling  with  mixing  debt  and  equity  and  to  create  value  by  overcoming  the 
financial barriers that they faced. Thus, the attention of financial economists shifted from 
optimal capital structure to optimal security design.    
The main implication of blending the theories of capital structure with the concept 
of security design was the acknowledgment of the fact that the securities issued by a firm 
do not only have cash flow features, but also governance features
229. The roots of this 
approach are found in an article written by Oliver Williamson
230, who in the framework 
of the discussion of the traditional dichotomy between debt and equity noted that these 
two should not be treated as alternative financial instruments, but rather as alternative 
governance structures
231. Security design is a process that does not merely tailor financial 
instruments,  so  as  to  help  investors  with  different  risk  preferences  to  meet  their 
investment goals, but is also a means to attain corporate governance objectives.  
Harris  and  Raviv  have  conducted  a  comprehensive  survey  of  the  numerous 
theories of capital structure that have been put forward and they have identified that there 
are overall four categories of potential determinants of capital structure
232. Of these four 
categories,  I  choose  to  examine  two  as  particularly  relevant  for  the  venture  capital 
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financing  setting:  the  one  that  views  a  firm’s  capital  structure  as  an  agency-cost 
mitigating mechanism and the one that considers it as a signaling mechanism. But, before 
engaging in their analysis, I believe that a brief reference to a distinct set of capital 
structure  theories  that  rely  on  tax  considerations  is  useful  as  a  starting  point  for  the 
discussion. The goal is not to describe in a comprehensive way the tax benefits of the use 
of convertible preferred stock, but rather to give the reader a sense of the role that tax 
considerations can play in an investor’s choice of security for investment and in the 
design of a start-up firm’s capital structure. 
3. Taxation and Capital Structure Choice; The Tax Effects of Convertible Preferred 
Stock in VC-backed firms 
 
Modigliani and Miller were again the first that attempted to establish a theory that 
defines an optimal capital structure
233. Their model was based on tax considerations; on 
the existence of taxation benefits for certain financial instruments. They indicated that 
because of the favorable tax treatment of interest payments
234, the value of the firm will 
rise as the level of substitution of debt for equity financing rises; a leveraged structure 
maximizes the value of the tax shield. However, as they acknowledge in the end of their 
paper
235, their argument is most likely deficient in the sense that it does not explain why 
firms  are  not  capitalized  exclusively  with  debt,  given  that  it  is  supposed  to  be  so 
advantageous
236. 
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Although taxation considerations fall largely outside the scope of the discussion 
on  corporate  governance,  there  is  not  doubt  that  companies  do  respond  to  taxation 
conditions with their financing and investment decisions
237. It is highly unlikely that a 
firm’s  capital  structure  will  not  be  affected  at  least  partially  by  some  tax  rules  that 
subsidize  the  use  of  a  particular  financial  instrument  over  another.  Consequently,  it 
comes as not surprise that some authors have put forward a tax explanation for the use of 
convertible preferred stock in VC financings
238. 
Their starting point is the fact that convertible preferred stock is not the financial 
instrument of choice in other developed economies
239. Therefore, there must be some US-
specific  reason  for  the  use  of  convertible  preferred  stock  by  VC  firms.  To  be  more 
precise, advocates of this opinion assert that if convertible preferred stock were truly the 
best way to cope with the problems of incomplete contracting –as I will try to show in the 
parts to follow- then its use would be universal and not constrained within the US
240. 
Thus,  tax  rules  might  constitute  a  domestic  variable  that  should  be  examined  as  a 
potential determinant of the choice of convertible preferred stock for the financing of 
start-up firms. 
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A careful look at US tax law reveals that the use of convertible preferred stock 
can help reduce the tax that managers of the start-up firm have to pay on their equity-
based compensation. A lower tax burden on the manager of the venture for the stock 
options she receives as a consideration for her services helps the incentivizing effect of 
equity-based executive compensation not to be weakened.  
Here is how convertible preferred stock becomes part of an efficient tax planning: 
the  firm’s  managers  are  provided  with  unvested  stock  options  as  part  of  their 
compensation. Given the compensatory character of this arrangement, the manager is 
obligated to pay tax at the income tax rate for these stock options. The amount of tax to 
be paid is computed on the basis of the grant-date value of the stock
241. Thus on the one 
hand, for tax purposes it is beneficial for the manager to report a low grant-date stock 
value
242. On the other hand, for financial purposes she wants the stock valuation to be as 
high as possible, because this will affect the amount of funds that will flow into the 
company as a result of the VC’s investment
243. The solution, in order to attain both goals, 
is to finance the company not through the purchase of common stock, but through the 
purchase of preferred stock. The price paid by the VC for the latter does not signify the 
exact value of the common stock, since the two types of securities have different payoff 
structures that lead to a different valuation; convertible preferred allows for a higher and 
more certain return on the investment and thus it is necessarily priced more favorably 
than common stock, which with an aggressive tax-reporting position can be reported at a 
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lower value than the actual one
244. As a result the manager is able to report a low taxable 
income at the grant date, when she will be taxed on the basis of the high income tax rate 
and when the share will appreciate in value in the future, she will be able to report the 
profits as capital gains and thus be taxed for the greatest portion of her compensation at a 
lower tax rate
245. 
However, as it is evident from the structure of the foregoing scheme, only the 
manager  benefits  from  tax  savings,  while  the  VC  as  a  taxpayer  does  not  enjoy  any 
advantage.  For  the  VC  this  whole  tax  planning  is  in  essence  another  corporate 
governance mechanism, namely another way to attain the goal of aligning the manager’s 
objectives with its own interests. As it was mentioned above, this tax scheme allows the 
incentive  attributes  of  the  equity-based  compensation  not  to  be  watered  down.  If  a 
significant portion of the incentive compensation that the manager receives had to be paid 
to the IRS, then its incentive effects would become weaker and the difference between 
stock options and a fixed salary would be negligible. But, by using convertible preferred 
stock as the vehicle of investment, the VC manages to preserve the incentivizing power 
of stock options, which is very important to cope with the problem of moral hazard. In 
essence, the tax device that convertible preferred stock puts in place indirectly helps an 
important corporate governance institution not to loose its value. 
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4. Capital Structure as an Agency Cost-Mitigating Mechanism 
i. The disciplining effects of debt 
The first group of theories of capital structure identifies the desire to alleviate 
conflicts of interest among the members of the firm as the driving force behind the choice 
of a capital structure by a firm. The equilibrium capital structure is determined so as to 
minimize the sum of agency costs
246; the corporate finance patterns of a firm are designed 
in such a way, so that the problems of moral hazard can be mitigated. The most cited 
paper  in  this  group  of  theories  of  capital  structure  is  actually  the  same  paper  that 
introduced the notion of agency costs and established the contractarian approach to the 
firm: Jensen’s and Meckling’s Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure
247. The paper explains the financial structure of a firm on the 
basis of the incentives that return patterns associated with different financial instruments 
trigger to the managers
248. Debt contracts reduce the amount of free cash flows available 
to managers by requiring the company to make fixed payments at specified dates. In 
general,  the  intervention  of  creditors  binds  managers  to  delivering  targeted  levels  of 
performance.  Given  that  free  cash  flows  are  traditionally  considered  as  a  source  of 
agency  costs,  it  follows  that  the  existence  of  debt  in  a  firm’s  financial  structure  can 
contribute to the reduction of agency costs and hence to the maximization of the firm’s 
                                                 
246 Martin Hellwig, A Reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling Model of Outside Finance, MPI Collective 
Goods Preprint No. 2007/8, 2. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=991079 
247 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19, 305. Other papers that view the capital structure of a firm as a result 
of the desire to control agency costs within the firm include Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Capital Structure 
and the Informational Role of Debt, 45 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 321; Rene Stulz, Managerial Discretion and 
Optimal Financing Policies, 26 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 3; David Hirshleifer & Anjan Thakor, 
Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice and Debt, 5 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 437  
248 Hellwig, supra note 246, 2    62 
value
249. Removing free cash from the corporation means removing an opportunity for 
the insiders to inflate their private benefits
250. 
However, while a highly leveraged structure mitigates the conflicts of interest 
between managers and equityholders, it acerbates the conflict between debtholders and 
equityholders
251. Debt contracts assign priority to debtholders over equityholders in the 
sense  that  equityholders  cannnot  get  a  return  on  their  investment  until  after  the 
debtholders’ claim is satisfied
252; the payment of a dividend before the payment on the 
loan is prohibited. It is in this way that the contractual structure of the firm renders 
equityholders the residual claimants. From this structure it follows that in the presence of 
debt the value of equity is like an option
253 (whose value is an increasing function of the 
variance of the underlying asset
254), so that equityholders have the incentive to increase 
the risk of the firm by investing in risky projects that have the potential of yielding a 
large return and leaving some residue for them to catch; equityholders can only benefit 
from such an investment, since they capture the upside, but should the project fail, they 
will  not  suffer  any  loss.  Thus,  a  leveraged  capital  structure  might  result  in  the  firm 
exchanging its low-risk assets for high-risk investments
255, even if this reduces the NPV 
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of the firm as a whole
256. Projects with positive NPV may be abandoned, if their only 
benefit  accrues  to  the  debtholders
257.  Thereupon,  the  equity  cushion,  upon  which 
debtholders  relied  when  they  extended  credit  to  the  firm,  is  gone  leaving  both  the 
creditors and the common shareholders worse off
258. In finance theory this is known as 
the  “asset  substitution  problem”  and  is  considered  to  be  an  agency  cost  of  debt 
financing
259 that counterbalances its benefits.  
ii.  Replicating  the  incentive-compatible  cash  flow  structure  of  debt  with  convertible 
preferred stock; Placing convertible preferred on the debt-equity continuum 
 
Given  that  the  highly  uncertain  environment  of  VC  financing  gives  rise  to 
increased agency problems, VCs will be keen on designing a capital structure for the VC-
backed firm that will embrace the philosophy of this first group of theories
260. In order to 
cope with the problem of moral hazard, VCs are expected to use the financial structure of 
the firm as a mechanism that complements the other incentive schemes that are used to 
discipline managers
261. After all, it is well documented in literature that the interaction 
between securities and incentives is central to VC financial planning
262. 
                                                 
256 Richard Green, Investment Incentives, Debt and Warrants, 13 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 115, 
115  
257 Stewart Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 147, 149  
258 Clifford Smith & Jerold Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 JOURNAL 
OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 117, 118-119  
259 Harris & Raviv, supra note 222, 69  
260 The fact that agency problems between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist are very important 
determinants of venture financing contract designs and hence of the capital structure that will ensue from 
this contract is emphasized by Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg, Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: 
Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses, 59 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2177, 2178  
261 Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-
Shareholder Congruence, 109 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1027, 1027 
262 Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach, 8 REVIEW OF 
FINANCE 75, 78    64 
A first option for VCs would be to take advantage of the disciplining effect that 
debt  has  and  thus  purchase  debt  instruments  for  their  investment  in  a  start-up  firm. 
However, as it has been noted in the VC literature
263, straight debt is an inappropriate 
vehicle of investment in firms that are in the initial stages of development; among other 
reasons, because these ventures do not generate sufficient working capital to repay a loan 
and because their value is locked in growth options rather than in tangible assets that can 
be foreclosed on, if the firm defaults on the repayment of the loan
264. In general, debt 
capital  is  only  suitable  for  companies  with  earnings  and  assets
265.  Contrarily,  equity 
capital can absorb uncertainty more easily
266. 
Apart from the economic unsuitability of debt for VC investments, there is also a 
legal risk associated with debt: unlimited liability of the creditor. If the VC used straight 
debt for its investment in the entrepreneurial firm, then it wouldn’t be able to attach to its 
security all these control rights that were discussed above without running the risk of 
being found itself liable for the liabilities of the firm. As the Restatement Second of 
Agency section 14 (O) puts it: “A creditor who assumes control of his debtor’s business 
for the mutual benefit of himself and his debtor, may become principal”. Based on this 
concept several courts have in the past characterized a creditor as the principal and the 
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debtor as the agent, when the former dominates the latter to the extent that the borrowing 
firm functions solely to achieve the purposes of the dominant lender
267.    
Thereupon, the ubiquitous security used for investment in start-up firms is not 
debt, but convertible preferred stock; a hybrid security that represents a combination of 
debt and equity interests
268. A financial instrument that shares elements of both paradigm 
debt and paradigm equity
269. Just like for any other hybrid security, the question that 
arises in this context is whether the convertible preferred stock that VCs use resembles 
more to debt or equity. If the range of existent corporate securities would be represented 
by means of a continuum that has straight debt at the one extreme and straight equity at 
the other, where exactly would convertible preferred stock lie?  Can this type of hybrid 
security replicate the incentive-compatible allocation of the cash flow rights of debt? 
What  debtlike  characteristics  does  it  have  that  can  potentially  produce  some  of  the 
disciplining effects that straight debt has on management? 
In response to the foregoing questions I will attempt to identify whether the cash 
flow patterns associated with the convertible preferred stock that VCs use can provide 
managers of the start-up venture with the incentives that debt does according to Jensen’s 
and Meckling’s model. To put it differently, the main goal of the following analysis is to 
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check  whether  convertible  preferred  stock  can  replicate  the  corporate  governance 
implications of debt in the start-up firm’s capital structure. 
A superficial approach of the issue would suggest that convertible preferred stock 
establishes a payoff structure that is closer to common equity rather than to paradigm 
debt. To be sure, in the corporate finance literature one can locate continua that look like 
the following (Figure 1)
270: 
 
    Straight          Zero-coupon        Traditional             Convertible               Mandatory                  Common  
fixed-income       convertible      convertible debt      preferred stock     convertible preferred           Equity 
<---------------------------                                                                                            ------------------------------>                                        
Debt Characteristics                                                                            Equity characteristics 
Figure 1 
 
This depiction might well be plausible for the typical convertible preferred stock 
that investors can find in the public securities markets, but is probably not accurate with 
regard to the idiosyncratic convertible preferred stock that VC-backed firms issue to VCs 
and that we described above under III.A. In fact, as it will become evident in the lines to 
follow, the VC convertible preferred purports to be more debtlike or at least appears to be 
conducive,  through  the  suis  generis  contractual  rights  attached  to  it,  to  produce  the 
incentives that pure debt produces.  
To  substantiate  my  argument,  I  am  going  to  use  insights  from  the  analytical 
framework that the rating agency Moody’s has established in order to classify publicly 
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traded hybrid securities into equitylike and debtlike
271. Despite the fact that Moody’s 
methodology is employed to assess the character of hybrid securities that are traded in 
public  securities  exchanges,  it  is  my  strong  conviction  that  the  criteria  used  for  this 
classification can be applied even in our case, where we seek to identify the character of a 
security issued by a private firm
272. 
  Moody’s  has  established  a  continuum  of  five  baskets  (A-E).  Securities  that 
belong  to  basket  A  are  treated  as  0%  equity  and  100%  debt.  At  the  other  extreme 
securities assigned to basket E are treated as 100% equity and 0% debt. The rest of the 
hybrid securities are classified into intermediate baskets on the basis of their equitylike or 
debtlike features
273. To accomplish this task the security in question is broken down into 
its basic characteristics, which are then compared to the following three attributes of 
paradigm  equity:  (i)  no  ongoing  payments;  (ii)  no  maturity;  and  (iii)  significant  loss 
absorption. The hybrid securities are subsequently scored based on the strength of their 
resemblance to pure common equity. The more remote their features are compared to the 
three foregoing characteristics, the more debtlike is the instrument.  
To identify whether the idiosyncratic convertible preferred stock that VCs use is 
close to common equity or not, I analyze briefly each of these three elements in turn and 
then  I  seek  the  points  of  intersection  or  points  of  divergence  between  convertible 
preferred and equity. 
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No ongoing payments: A fundamental element of common equity is that the 
issuer can skip a dividend payment without triggering an event of default. This provides 
the issuer with substantial financial flexibility, which is particularly valuable in periods of 
financial distress or in the initial stages of development. As far as VC-style convertible 
preferred stock is concerned, there is no doubt that it entitles its holder to dividends, 
which means that in principle there is no contractual obligation for the start-up firm to 
make a fixed payment. Nonetheless, the fact that in the VC context this security usually 
has cumulative rights to dividends attached to it significantly compromises the benefits of 
financial flexibility. If the purpose of VC-style convertible preferred was to replicate 
common stock more closely, then the parties should have agreed upon a non-cumulative 
structure rather than upon a cumulative one
274. With the liability of accrued dividend 
hanging over the firm, the managers do not have so much the incentive to accumulate 
cash and liquid assets (free cash flows), which will give them greater discretion over 
future  decisions
275.  Therefore,  the  agency  costs  associated  with  free  cash  flows  are 
somewhat reduced due to the existence of cumulative dividends. 
No  maturity  (no  principal  repayment):  Paradigm  equity  does  not  give  the 
security  holder  the  right  for  repayment  in  full.  “Common  stock  does  not  have  to  be 
repaid”
276. There is no fixed claim on the firm’s cash flow, like there is in the case of a 
debt claim, where a demand for repayment of the principal exists. Again, the practice of 
VC financings has undermined this attribute of common stock, since the redemption right 
attached to the convertible preferred stock makes the issuer face “a potentially major 
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claim on cash flow, similar to the payment in full of an obligation due at maturity”
277. 
Consequently, the potential for the managers to accumulate a pool of liquid reserves with 
all  its  resultant  problems  is  reduced,  much  like  it  happens  in  companies  with  highly 
leveraged structures. 
Significant loss absorption: Common shareholders absorb the risk of a potential 
performance shortfall by means of their position as residual claimants of the firm
278. As 
they have contracted for the rights to net cash flows
279, they have undertaken the risk of 
any distressed situation. Their claim is subordinated to all other claims on the firm’s 
assets. VCs as preferred shareholders are never found in this situation, since they have 
seniority over common stockholders with regard to dividend payments and distribution of 
assets in the case of liquidation; unpaid accrued dividends must be paid before any value 
is paid out to common shareholders
280.  
This  income  stream  attached  to  preferred  stock  is  itself  actually  an  incentive 
scheme for the managers
281; an incentive scheme identical to the one that a debt payoff 
structure creates. The founder and the managers, holders of the common stock, know 
that, if the firm does poorly then they will either get less than their pro rata share of the 
company’s value or even nothing, if this value is less than the liquidation preference
282. 
Thus, much like when there is debt in the capital structure, the managers-equityholders 
have  an  increased  incentive  to  build  value  for  the  firm.  In  other  words,  shifting  the 
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residual  risk  on  the  managers  by  means  of  the  use  of  preferred  stock  reduces 
entrepreneurial opportunism and increases the managers’ incentive to create value
283. 
Nevertheless, the dividend and liquidation preference that preferred stock carries 
might result in the asset substitution syndrome that is caused by managers, who want to 
maximize  the  value  of  their  residual  claim  while  financing  operations  with  senior 
instruments
284.  Similar  to  what  happens,  when  the  firm  has  debt  obligations,  the 
managers, whose compensation is partially equity-based, might want to engage in highly 
risky projects hoping that, should they succeed, their will be in the end some value left to 
be distributed to them. At this point is where convertible preferred stock proves itself 
superior as a corporate governance mechanism when compared to straight debt, because 
not  only  it  is  conducive  to  generate  the  same  beneficial  corporate  governance 
implications that debt does, but it can also shield the company from these problems of 
risk  alteration
285.  The  latter  is  accomplished  by  means  of  the  convertibility  feature 
attached  to  the  security.  The  put  component  impedes  the  distortionary  risk-taking 
incentives of managers, since they know that, even if their risky project succeeds, the VC 
might convert its preferred into common and thus they will have to share the payoffs with 
the VC
286. Convertible preferred stock reduces the manager’s share, when high profit is 
realized and thus makes excessive risk taking less appealing
287. 
All in all, the idiosyncratic convertible preferred stock that VCs use as a vehicle 
for their investment in start-up firms purports to be more debtlike rather than equitylike, 
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if one uses the criteria that Moody’s Tool Kit puts forward for assessing the character of 
hybrid securities. The cash flow structures associated with VC-style convertible preferred 
stock are conducive to replicate the income streams attached to debt instruments and thus 
the start-up firm is able to benefit from the disciplining effects that debt has according to 
Jensen and Meckling. In addition to this, convertible preferred stock appears to mitigate 
to  a  certain  extent  the  asset  substitution  effect  that  might  arise  in  firms  with  highly 
leveraged structures and thus one could postulate that while it promotes the beneficial 
corporate  governance  implications  of  debt,  it  prevents  the  unraveling  of  the  latter’s 
detrimental effects. Consequently, convertible preferred stock proves to be an efficient 
corporate governance mechanism that addresses satisfactorily the problems caused by 
moral hazard, one of the three major dimensions of the lato sensu incompleteness of 
contracts. 
5. Capital Structure as a Signaling Mechanism 
i. Leverage signaling models 
The second group of theories of capital structure views a firm’s capital structure 
as a response to the problem of adverse selection that can arise in financial markets due to 
asymmetric information. Insiders possess more information about the firm’s assets and 
investment opportunities than outside potential capital suppliers. For many authors
288, a 
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firm’s  choice  of  a  specific  capital  structure  signals  to  market  participants  the  private 
information that insiders have about the quality of the firm
289. By looking at a company’s 
financial structure, investors can draw inferences about the firm’s profit profile. In other 
words,  one  of  the  driving  forces  behind  a  firm’s  determination  of  its  financial 
composition is its desire to convey private information to the market about its expected 
earnings and thus signal its type. Authors in this set of approaches to the theory of capital 
structure have identified equity as a negative signal and debt as a positive one. In the 
majority of models put forward in the literature, there is a positive correlation between 
firm quality and leverage. 
 The issuance of equity is viewed by market participants as a signal that the firm’s 
equity  is  overvalued
290.  This  assertion  is  backed  by  event  studies  that  show  that  the 
announcement  of  equity  issues  is  associated  with  negative  event  returns
291.  To  the 
contrary,  a  higher  proportion  of  debt  is  perceived  as  a  signal  of  higher  quality  and, 
therefore,  should  the  firm  decide  to  issue  more  of  it,  its  weighted  cost  of  capital  is 
expected to be reduced
292.  
Among  the  several  debt  signaling  models  that  are  proposed  in  theory,  I  have 
chosen to refer to two; one that cannot be applied in the VC context and one that can be 
applied. The non-applicable model will help illustrate more the nature of convertible 
preferred  stock  and  the  fact  that  although  it  can  replicate  some  of  the  corporate 
governance implications of debt, it cannot be a complete substitute for debt in all aspects. 
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By means of the applicable model it will be demonstrated that convertible preferred stock 
apart from being valuable for dealing with moral hazard problems, is also a significant 
arrow  in  the  quiver  of  VCs  to  address  the  problem  of  adverse  selection,  the  other 
dimension of the incompleteness of contracts.  
According to the first of the two approaches, the reason why debt is viewed as 
conveying such favorable information is that as the level of debt increases, the risk of 
insolvency increases as well and thus the company faces a higher probability of having to 
cope with the various costs surrounding the event of bankruptcy; given that lower quality 
firms incur necessarily higher expected bankruptcy costs, they will naturally be deterred 
from  using  highly  leveraged  structures,  whereas  the  remoteness  of  the  event  of 
bankruptcy for high quality firms lowers their expected bankruptcy costs thus allowing 
them to issue more debt
293. Hence, low quality firms find it more costly to incur higher 
levels of debt, than do firms with higher expected cash flows, for which bankruptcy is 
less likely
294. High quality firms can send a credible signal to market participants by 
loading their capital structure with more debt, while low quality firms (“lemons”) have no 
incentive to mimic this
295, because it would be way too costly. Consequently, pursuant to 
this view market participants can sort high quality from low quality firms by looking at 
the level of debt in each firm’s capital structure
296.  
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Apparently  convertible  preferred  stock  cannot  fulfill  this  function,  because  its 
issuance does not give rise to the risk of a bankruptcy penalty. Although it is definitely a 
debtlike financial instrument, a default on the payment of a preferred dividend does not 
trigger an event of default that can force the issuer into bankruptcy. This is a major 
difference between this hybrid security and paradigm debt. Therefore, this model has no 
value in the VC context, as long as VCs have convertible preferred as their investment 
vehicle.  
According to the second of the two approaches, when a firm chooses to obtain 
external finance through debt rather than equity, it means that its management retains a 
higher proportion of ownership in the firm
297. If the firm were of low quality, then the 
insiders wouldn’t choose to act in this way, because a larger equity stake would be costly 
to  a  risk-averse  manager.  Contrarily,  a  manager  who  is  confident  about  its  firm’s 
potential chooses to keep a larger portion of equity because she considers it as less risky 
and thus less costly, given the profit profile of her firm. Thus, higher levels of debt give a 
positive credible signal to capital suppliers, who can use this reasoning to sort out good 
firms from bad firms. 
ii.  Reversing  the  signaling  game;  Sorting  out  entrepreneurs  by  using  convertible 
preferred stock 
 
By relying on the axioms of the second of the two leverage signaling theories of 
capital  structure,  VCs  have  the  potential  of  developing  a  screening  mechanism 
complementary to the one of staged investment that we examined in Part II. However, in 
order to accomplish this function the signaling game that was described above must be 
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reversed  and  be  transformed  into  a  screening  strategy.  This  is  because  in  the  VC 
financing setting the entrepreneur (the informed party of the game) does not have the 
bargaining power to move first and choose its capital structure on her own, when she is 
approaching the VC to ask for financing
298. Therefore, the entrepreneur is not able to 
signal –in the game theoretic sense- to the VC by loading its capital structure with more 
debt than equity. Thus, the informed agent cannot move first and thereupon the model 
cannot work in exactly the same way, as it was described above.  
  Nonetheless, the VC can still take advantage of the signal that debt conveys so 
as to structure the following screening game: given that the VC has the bargaining power 
to move first and to dictate its preferred terms in the financial contract
299, it can offer to 
the informed start-up firms a menu of incentive compatible choices (contracts), from 
which they will self-select revealing their private information through their choice
300. 
Those that will choose the contract that will load their capital structure with convertible 
preferred  stock,  which  will  necessarily  leave  more  space  to  the  managers  to  take  an 
equity stake in the company, will reveal their confidence in the potential of their venture. 
In essence, convertible preferred does here what debt does according to the second of the 
two models: it screens good firms from bad firms by letting their management show how 
much confidence they have in their firm. 
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C. Financial Contracting Theory and its Application in VC Financings: Governance 
Features of Convertible Preferred Stock II 
 
The  foregoing  analysis  makes  evident  that  the  VCs  have  developed  a 
sophisticated financing process
301, which successfully addresses two major challenges of 
contracting: moral hazard and adverse selection. However, going back to Part I and the 
mapping of the impasses of contracts, we see that there is one more contractual problem 
that VCs have to deal with: the stricto sensu incompleteness of contracts; the fact that the 
parties to a contract cannot possibly specify fully all future contingencies that will affect 
their relationship. In this section I am going to scrutinize how VCs struggle against the 
problem  created  by  these  unspecified  future  eventualities  and  what  marks  does  this 
struggle leave on the corporate governance structure of the VC-backed firm. 
 
1. Advanced Security Design: Separating Cash Flow and Control Rights  
It has been stated in the financial contracting literature that incentive problems 
alone cannot help shape a satisfactory theory of capital structure
302. Therefore, authors 
that belong to this stream of thought have introduced an additional consideration in the 
financial structure design process: the allocation of decision or control rights. This theory 
postulates that cash flow rights and control rights should not be necessarily viewed as two 
sides of the same coin, but they should be thought of as independent instruments that can 
well be separated
303.  
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Indeed, one of the key issues in designing securities in the framework of the VC 
contracting  process  is  separately  allocating  cash  flow  and  control  rights  between  the 
investors  and  the  entrepreneur
304305.  In  fact,  one  of  the  reasons  why  VCs  choose 
convertible preferred in order to invest in the entrepreneurial firm is because it allows 
them  greater  flexibility  to  obtain  that  separation
306.  In  regard  to  this  aspect,  the  VC 
financing  process  seems  to  be  taking  under  account  this  first  axiom  of  financial 
contracting theory. 
 In general, separation of cash flow from control allows corporate planners first to 
create income streams that incentivize the managers to exert optimal effort (see III.B) and 
then,  independently  from  the  financial  structure  that  is  established  by  these  return 
patterns, to provide a certain class of investors with control over the firm’s decision 
mechanisms. If we were to provide a simple definition of the separation of cash flow and 
control we would state that it is the process, by which the right to the residual income 
from an asset is detached from the residual right to control the fate of this asset
307.  This 
again turns to the idea that was discussed above (III.B.2) that securities need not to be 
determined exogenously and taken with the rights that are customarily attached to them 
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under their paradigm form, but can be developed and engineered endogenously so that 
they can help the issuer or the investor achieve its strategic and financial goals.  
By using covenants in the financing contract VCs allow themselves without being 
the residual claimants of the firm to have significant control over a certain number of 
board seats, voting power on an as-converted basis, veto rights over major corporate 
transactions and even the right to replace the CEO
308 (which can actually be the result of 
having majority of the voting power or of the board seats). Thus, an idiosyncratic quasi-
dual class structure is established within the start-up firm. This allocation of control rights 
affects the corporate governance structure of the firm in a much more direct way than the 
allocation of cash flow rights. While the design patterns of the latter simply affect the 
incentives of the members of the firm, the designation of the former instantly assigns the 
levers by which some of these members will decide the usages of the firm’s underlying 
assets
309. However, although in “custom-made” combinations the two types of rights may 
not  go  hand  in  hand  like  when  securities  are  left  intact  with  their  exogenous 
characteristics, their allocation still remains largely interdependent in the sense that the 
desideratum when designing cash flow rights is to provide those who are assigned the 
control rights with optimal incentives to make the right decisions
310. Income streams and 
control rights are thus correlated even when they are separated, in the sense that the 
allocation of the former ensures the success in the allocation of the latter
311.  
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Picking the right persons within the firm to entrust them with the decision-making 
authority over the firm’s actions is vital, for it determines whether the players respond 
efficiently to the contractual challenge of inherent stricto sensu incompleteness. Since 
certain  actions  and  the  circumstances  under  which  they  are  taken  are  frequently 
noncontractible
312, the best the parties to the corporate contract can do is at least specify 
who will have the decision-making authority over these eventualities; and they should 
make sure that the person who is assigned the authority has the optimal incentives at this 
point to maximize the firm’s utility. Since all potential conflicts of interest between the 
manager and the suppliers of capital cannot be resolved through ex ante contracting
313, 
the firm’s value partially depends and on the allocation of control rights
314. 
In the following lines I will examine, which criteria financial contracting theory 
suggests  that  parties  to  a  financial  contract  should  use  in  order  to  obtain  an  optimal 
allocation of control rights and I will evaluate whether the control assignment patterns 
observed in VC investments follow these criteria. 
2.  Financial  Contracting  Theory  and  the  State-Contingent  Optimal  Allocation  of 
Control Rights 
 
The framework of inquiry of the models articulated in financial contracting theory 
is the stricto sensu incompleteness of contracts. Many events, on the basis of which 
significant governance effects are going to be shaped, cannot be adequately specified in 
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advance
315 and thus they will be necessarily omitted from the initial financing contract. 
Still  parties  can  include  in  their  contract  a  provision  that  will  touch  upon  these 
noncontractible events and will transfer control either to the investor or the entrepreneur 
upon their occurrence. Thus, it follows that control rights will be necessarily contingent 
on  the  incidence  of  future  variables.  In  line  with  this  concept,  financial  contracting 
theory
316  has  established  a  “contingent  control  model”  on  the  optimal  allocation  of 
decision-making  authority.  In  other  words,  according  to  the  financial  contracting 
literature the optimal balance of control between the manager and the investors is not flat, 
but state-contingent. 
The model that has been cited the most for the purposes of analyzing the financial 
contract between the VC and the entrepreneur is the one of Aghion and Bolton
317. The 
reason that Aghion’s and Bolton’s model is chosen as the center of analysis in the VC 
literature is that it assumes a single entrepreneur, a single investor and a single project; 
assumptions that are very close to the reality of VC investments. The starting point of the 
model is that the entrepreneur derives both pecuniary (: cash flows) and non-pecuniary 
benefits  (:  private  benefits  of  control)  from  the  project,  while  the  investor  can  only 
benefit from the project’s cash flows. The two have different utility functions and thus 
there will be unavoidably conflicts of interest during the course of their relationship. But, 
if control rights are allocated properly between the two, then at least the impact of these 
conflicts of interest on the total value of the firm can be minimized
318. Consequently, 
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given the assumptions that the allocation of decision rights should be state-contingent and 
that this allocation will determine the impact that conflicts of interest have on the success 
of the project, the question posed by financial contracting theory can be formulated as 
follows: in what states of the world it will be optimal to give the control rights to the 
entrepreneur and in what states of the world it is the investor that should be vested with 
decision-making authority? 
    To answer this question a corporate planner should realize which states of the 
world create suboptimal incentives for either the entrepreneur or the outside investor. At 
the point, where a certain state of the world, a certain financial condition, creates the 
incentive for the entrepreneur-manager to underinvest or to increase the riskiness of the 
project, control should be transferred to the outside investor
319. Thereupon, in the initial 
contract  verifiable  indicia  should  be  ascertained  that  will  signal  that  the  incentive  to 
invest inefficiently is present in the entrepreneur and that at this point a transfer of control 
should occur. 
One  of  the  ways  to  realize  when  the  entrepreneur  will  have  the  tendency  for 
suboptimal decision-making is to look at the kind of income stream that is attached to the 
instrument she holds. In the case of VC-backed firms this instrument is almost always 
common  stock;  the  entrepreneur  is  usually  an  equityholder.  Equityholder  control  is 
generally optimal in good states of the world, when the firm is solvent and not financially 
constrained
320.  This  is  because  under  these  circumstances  equityholders  truly  are  the 
residual claimants of the firm and thus have an incentive to maximize cash inflows. It 
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follows then, that when the financial performance of the VC firm is good, the control 
should  stay  with  the  entrepreneur.  However,  when  the  firm  is  entering  the  zone  of 
insolvency and there is the threat that the cash flows it generates will not be sufficient so 
as to produce a dividend after the payments to creditors, then equityholders, if in control, 
will invest inefficiently by increasing the riskiness of the project (see III.B.4.i). At this 
point  control  should  be  transferred  to  debtholders  because  it  is  them  that  have  now 
become the residual claimants
321. In VC-backed firms, where VCs claims are, as it was 
proved above (see III.B.4.ii), debtlike, it is to the VCs that decision-making authority 
should be transferred in bad states of the world.  
 Based on this observations the contingent control model of Aghion and Bolton 
suggests that when an entrepreneurial firm is not financially constrained, control should 
remain with the entrepreneur-common stockholder, while during hard times it should be 
assigned to outside investors that hold debt or debtlike claims. Thus, if control rights 
were depicted as lying on a pendulum programmed to swing to pre-specified directions at 
pre-specified points in time, it should be programmed to swing towards the entrepreneur 
when the proxies for financial performance look good and to the outside investor when 
performance is measured as poor
322. Aghion and Bolton advocate that this particular kind 
of contingent control allocation can be obtained naturally with debt financing
323 in the 
sense  that  the  exogenously  given  allocation  of  control  rights  that  paradigm  debt 
establishes does lead to the above optimal distribution of decision-making authority. 
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Therefore, what remains to be examined is whether the covenants embedded in 
VC convertible preferred stock are designed in a way that achieves the kind of allocation 
of control rights that financial contracting theory claims is optimal for entrepreneurial 
firms. Does the pendulum of control rights swings to the direction of the VC in bad times 
and towards the entrepreneur in good times? Does convertible preferred stock proves not 
only  to  have  the  motivational  properties  of  debt  (see  III.B),  but  also  its  (optimal) 
“control-allocational” attributes? 
3. Optimal Programming of the Control Rights Pendulum in VC Contracts 
As a general matter, the nature of the VC’s involvement in the start-up firm is 
widely acknowledged to be state-contingent
324. The strategy of staged investment, which 
was analyzed in Part II is the foremost element of the contingency pattern. In addition to 
this, empirical data show that cash flow rights are also allocated on a state-contingent 
basis
325.  The  general  pattern  is  that  when  the  performance  of  the  VC-backed  firm 
improves the entrepreneur captures a larger fraction of the total cash flows, while when 
the venture performs poorly then it is the VC that is entitled to a larger proportion of the 
total cash flows
326. To illustrate this motive, it suffices to look at the layout of some cash 
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flow rights, such as the convertibility option, the anti-dilution protection, the redemption 
right
327 and the dividend and liquidation preference.  
Starting with the convertibility option, if the start-up firm turns out to perform 
well, then the VC may want to convert its preferred stock into equity and thus be entitled 
to  a  portion  of  the  upside
328.  To  be  sure,  in  most  VC  contracts  when  a  firm’s  good 
performance results in an IPO or an acquisition at a high price, then the conversion of the 
convertible preferred into common is mandatory, it occurs automatically. The result of 
the conversion is that now the entrepreneur does not have to wait for the VC to be paid its 
dividend or liquidation preference before she can receive anything from the distribution, 
but instead stands in the same place with the VC in terms of sharing in the firm’s cash 
flows; thus, after the conversion the entrepreneur is able to capture a larger proportion of 
the total cash flows than she did before.  
As far as the redemption right is concerned, if the portfolio company performs 
poorly and no liquidity event takes place within a period of time specified in the contract, 
then the VC can put the stock back to the firm and cash out its investment. On the 
contrary, if the venture performs well and consummates an IPO or a profitable trade sale 
within the same amount of time, then the VC is not entitled to exercise the put option.  
Turning to the application of anti-dilution provisions, their protection is triggered 
after follow-on financing rounds take place. If the start-up firm does not perform well, 
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then  the  follow-on  financing  will  take  place  at  a  lower  valuation.  The  anti-dilution 
protection will in this case allow the VC to get more shares, thus making sure that in this 
bad state of the world the cash flows, to which it is entitled are not reduced.  
Finally, as far as the foremost characteristic of convertible preferred is concerned, 
the dividend and liquidation preference, the same contingency pattern applies. When the 
firm  performs  poorly,  then  its  total  cash  flows  are  going  to  be  small  and  thus  the 
preference is going to allow the VC to capture a higher fraction of the (small) total sum. 
As  the  firm’s  performance  improves,  then  more  is  left  for  the  common  shareholder-
entrepreneur to benefit from
329. 
   Apart from the cash flow rights that are allocated on a state-contingent basis, 
empirical data show that control rights as well are not held at all times by either the VC 
or the entrepreneur, but there is rather “a continuous variable that is adjusted and fine-
tuned through a multitude of contingent provisions”
330 that makes the possession of this 
type  of  rights  conditional  upon  the  occurrence  of  observable  measures  of  firm 
performance
331. However, according to the axioms of financial contracting theory mere 
state-contingency  of  the  control  rights  is  not  sufficient  for  the  company  to  optimally 
respond to the challenge of the stricto sensu incompleteness of contracts. Additionally, 
the  pendulum  of  control  rights  should  be  programmed  in  such  a  way,  so  that  more 
governance intervention is allowed to the VC when performance is poor and more to the 
entrepreneur when performance is good. Only this scheme will ensure that control will 
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stand each time with the person that has the optimal incentives of maximizing the value 
of the venture. 
  One of the determinants of the programming of such a pendulum in firms is 
expected to be the level and the direction of informational asymmetries at the time the 
contract is drafted
332. Given the extreme uncertainties that exist in start-up investments 
and  the  concomitant  severity  of  agency  problems,  the  VC  will  naturally  want  to  get 
control in more states of the world
333, at least until more (and positive) information about 
the prospects of the venture are revealed. As a general matter, this desire of the VCs tends 
to result in an unusual corporate governance structure of the VC-backed firm, where 
preferred rather than common shareholders control the board
334 for the greatest part of the 
firm’s pre-IPO life
335. 
Nonetheless,  in  Kaplan’s  and  Strömberg’s  empirical  study  there  is  indeed 
evidence  of  accounting  and  performance  indicia  that  are  utilized  in  the  drafting  of 
covenants,  pursuant  to  which  control  shifts  gradually  towards  the  entrepreneur  as 
performance improves
336. 
First  of  all,  this  control-shifting  pattern  is  evident  in  the  typical  provisions 
governing the conversion feature of the VC preferred stock. As it was noted above, when 
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performance improves the VC may opt to convert its preferred into common stock or if a 
major liquidity event takes place the preferred converts automatically. The conversion 
has implications for the VC’s cash flow rights, but it also has an impact on the scope of 
the VC’s control rights, since there are clauses in the charter that state that the increased 
control rights, such as disproportionate share of votes, reserved board seats and veto 
powers, that the VC used to have are lost upon conversion
337. The pendulum of control 
rights  is  thus  programmed  to  swing  towards  the  entrepreneur  in  case  the  firm  is 
performing so good that the convertibility option is exercised. Therefore, in regard to this 
aspect the governance of the VC firm purports to be in alignment with the basic axioms 
of financial contracting theory. 
Kaplan’s & Strömberg’s survey reports a series of other provisions found in VC 
contracts that espouse the proposition of financial contracting theory: the VC may vote 
for  all  of  its  preferred  shares  on  an  as-converted  basis  only  if  the  venture’s  EBIT 
(earnings before interest and taxes) are below a certain threshold; if net worth of the firm 
is below a certain threshold then the VC will get three more board seats; if the firm fails 
to pay out a certain fraction of its revenues as dividend, then the VC gets to elect the 
majority of the board etc.
338. 
But  the  most  illustrative  and  archetypal  contingent-control  provision  that 
embraces the principles of financial contracting theory is the fact that in a VC-backed 
firm control shifts entirely to the entrepreneur upon the IPO. Black & Gilson in a seminal 
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paper on the importance of securities markets for the success of a VC industry
339 claim 
that a foundational element of VC investments rests not in one of the explicit provisions 
of the financial contract, but in an implicit contract between the VC and the entrepreneur 
that control will shift to the latter entirely upon a successful IPO
340. This is feasible due to 
the dispersed ownership structure that US firms tend to have after they go public that 
essentially allows the managers to pull the strings in the firm’s operations. To be sure, 
Black & Gilson claim that it is easier to infuse a VC contract with this implicit state-
contingent  control  device,  than  it  is  with  difficult  and  costly  to  negotiate  explicit 
provisions that condition control shift on specified financial milestones
341. 
All in all, empirical evidence shows that VC contracts are structured in a way that 
allows for control rights to be allocated in the way financial contracting theory deems 
optimal. This is a sign that VC-backed firms implement corporate governance structures 
that efficiently address the contractual challenge of stricto sensu incompleteness.  
 
IV. The Mandatory Model of Corporate Law in Europe and its Implications 
for Venture Capital 
A. Comparing the US and the European VC Industry 
The  past  few  years  have  seen  a  growing  number  of  papers  in  the  area  of 
comparative corporate finance scholarship, which attempt to identify and shed light on 
the differences in VC financings around the world
342. As far as the comparison between 
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the  US  and  the  European  VC  industry  is  concerned
343,  authors  in  the  overwhelming 
majority of papers tend to focus on two remarkable disparities: (i) the non-prevalence of 
convertible preferred stock in European VC financings
344; and (ii) the considerably lower 
rates  of  return  on  VC  investments  in  Europe,  when  compared  to  the  US
345.  As  an 
American commentator puts it “venture capital is the one technique our competitors in 
other industrial countries have yet to master”
346. Several ideas have been put on the table 
to explain this divergence and they implicate historical, institutional, political, legal and 
cultural
347 considerations. Elements of truth are found in all arguments and it is thus most 
likely a combination of factors that has led to the observed gap between Europe and the 
US,  as  far  as  the  size,  performance  and  transactional  practice  of  the  VC  industry  is 
concerned.  
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First  of  all,  it  takes  some  time  for  institutions  of  financial  intermediation  to 
develop
348 and therefore it seems plausible to assert that the VC industry in the US had 
more time to mature, since it essentially appeared after World War II, while the spread of 
VC to Europe didn’t occur until the early 80s
349. To be more precise, with time comes 
learning about optimal or effective contracts
350 and therefore the US VCs were able to 
experiment by spreading learning costs over time and gradually fine-tune a sophisticated 
financing process that optimally tackles the challenges of contracting
351. This might help 
explain the first point of divergence, namely that European VCs tend not to use so often 
the financially optimal security of convertible preferred stock but instead use the less 
complex instrument of common equity
352.  
In addition to this, Europe lags behind in terms of size of securities markets, 
which are deemed essential for the development of a robust VC industry. Active stock 
exchanges not only provide the VC with the profitable exit strategy of the IPO, but they 
also incentivize the entrepreneur, who aspires to regain control, if the firm goes public
353. 
Furthermore,  deep  securities  markets  allow  the  institutional  investors  that  choose  to 
invest in VC funds to hedge against the high risk of failure that VC investments usually 
have. Despite the establishment of the “Euro Neuer Markt” (EURO.NM), a cross-border 
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stock exchange that specializes in listing small companies and start-up firms
354, Europe 
as  a  general  matter,  relying  more  on  a  bank-oriented  financial  system,  is  unable  to 
compete  with  the  deep  securities  markets  that  form  the  backbone  of  the  American 
economy. This results in a lower median excess return on VC investments in Europe
355. 
Given the importance of VC for technological innovation and economic development
356, 
this underperformance of the European VC industry has led to initiatives, such as the EU 
Commission’s  Risk  Capital  Action  Plan  and  the  EU-sponsored  research  project  of 
RICAFE  (“Risk  Capital  and  the  Financing  of  European  Innovative  Firms”)
357,  which 
attempt to identify the weaknesses of VC financing in Europe and to provide a roadmap 
for overcoming them. 
Moreover, as it was mentioned earlier in the paper (III.B.3), the non-prevalence of 
the use of convertible preferred stock in European VC investments is partially attributed 
to the fact that tax rules do not subsidize its use, as is the case in the US
358. To stimulate 
VC financing, some European countries have provided tax incentives for investors that 
hold participations in VC partnerships
359 or have their funds invested in VC trusts
360, but 
apparently this type of incentives does not subsidize specifically the use of convertible 
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preferred stock, which is a financially optimal instrument for start-ups and thereupon 
could help European VC investments to have a higher rate of return. 
Finally, a small number of papers seek to evaluate the impact of legal factors –
other than tax- on the development of a robust VC industry in a country. Some of these 
papers are simply an extension of the literature on the relationship between a country’s 
legal origin and its financial development
361 and have as a reference point the seminal 
paper of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny on law and finance
362. Other 
scholarly  contributions  examine  the  impact  of  bankruptcy  law  on  the  European  VC 
transactional  practice
363,  while  only  a  very  small  portion  attempts  to  identify  a  link 
between a country’s corporate law and VC performance
364. 
In the following sections by relying on the valuable inferences that were drawn 
within the scope of Parts I to III, I seek to explain the impact of the mandatory nature of 
European corporate law on VC transactional practice. With this analysis I aspire to add 
another layer of ideas to the aforementioned small part of the corporate finance literature 
that views a country’s corporate law as a determinant of the VC industry’s performance. 
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B. The Enabling Character of US Corporate Law versus the Mandatory Nature of 
European Corporate Law 
 
In a comparative corporate law discourse that would focus on public corporations 
a reference to the old debate on the contrast between enabling and mandatory corporate 
law  would  be  of  little  significance.  This  is  because  currently  in  most  developed 
jurisdictions -and certainly in the US and in the EU- public companies are to a large 
extent subject to mandatory rules; rules promulgated either by a central regulator, like the 
US  federal  securities  laws
365,  or  by  self-regulatory  organizations
366,  namely  by  the 
various stock exchanges, where companies voluntarily choose to list their securities, but 
once they make this step they are subject to standards of mandatory nature
367. In addition 
to this, as far as public companies are concerned, transatlantic cross-listings function as a 
vehicle of convergence not only of the general character of corporate law, but also of its 
substantive content
368. However, in the framework of a discussion that focuses on venture 
capital, where one is concerned with the legal regime of small private companies, the 
comparison between enabling and mandatory corporate law seems to be still critical. 
US corporate laws, and in particular Delaware corporate law, reflect a facilitative 
rather  than  regulatory  treatment  of  corporations  made  up  largely  of  optional,  default 
rules, which corporate constituencies may contract around in order to obtain a private 
ordering of their affairs
369. On the contrary, most European jurisdictions, especially those 
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of continental Europe, have cemented a rigid and mandatory structure of corporate law 
that fixes key features of corporate governance and corporate finance without having 
enough play in the joints
370. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that when authors 
choose to depict the various national corporate laws on a flexibility/rigidity continuum
371, 
Delaware law is on the one extreme while most European jurisdictions on the other
372. 
There are historically many reasons why such a different path was followed on 
the two sides of the Atlantic, but their comprehensive analysis here would fall outside the 
scope of the chapter
373. Perhaps it suffices to point to the emergence of a jurisdictional 
competition among the US states in the beginning of the 20
th century that had them 
competing to attract firms by enacting corporation codes with a minimum of restrictive 
provisions
374. At the same time European legislators answered to the “founders’ boom” 
following the liberalization of entry requirements for companies with a backlash that 
established mandatory provisions for the organization of the internal affairs of a limited 
liability company
375. 
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As a general matter, the optional or mandatory character of corporate law in a 
jurisdiction  influences  mainly  the  allocation  of  control  rights  among  corporate 
constituencies
376.  The  internal  distribution  of  decision-making  authority  differs 
significantly  in  companies  that  function  under  a  mandatory  regime  of  corporate  law, 
compared to firms that are governed by a set of suppletive rules
377; the allocation of 
control rights cannot be changed by private agents where law is mandatory, whereas 
where rules are optional it can be contractually adjusted. In Europe there is a clear and 
fixed division of powers between the shareholders and the directors, while in Delaware 
this issue is left largely to the charter of each firm
378. However, should the promoters of a 
Delaware  firm  choose  to  avoid  the  bargaining  costs  associated  with  tailoring  a  suis 
generis charter, they can follow the default rule that grants an extensive authority to the 
board with regard to the affairs of the corporation
379. 
Apart  from  control  rights,  the  nature  of  corporate  law  also  has  an  impact  on 
several  issues  pertaining  to  corporate  finance.  In  the  great  majority  of  European 
jurisdictions there are stringent rules that require a minimum capital or minimum par 
value of shares
380, restrict authorized unissued capital
381, establish preemptive rights for 
the shareholders
382 or restrict the right of the company to repurchase its own shares
383. In 
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Delaware  all  of  these  issues  are  left  either  to  the  charter  or  to  the  discretion  of  the 
directors with minimal interference from statutory law. It is also worth mentioning that in 
Europe  shareholders  can  make  distributions  to  themselves  in  the  form  of  dividend 
payments,  while  one  of  the  hallmark  features  of  Delaware  corporate  law  is  that 
management can withhold such payments
384. 
C. Does the Mandatory Nature of European Corporate Laws Directly Impede VC 
Contracting? 
 
As it became evident in Parts II and III, successfully structuring VC transactions 
requires a great deal of contracting flexibility. Parties need to be able to separate cash 
flow from control rights, allocate the latter on a state-contingent basis, design securities 
in  a  way  that  incentivizes  the  entrepreneur  and  that  provides  the  VC  with  downside 
protection.  Therefore,  they  obviously  need  rules  that  would  provide  them  with  the 
opportunity to privately order their transaction and to fashion the governance structure of 
the start-up firm in a way that will increase the odds for success. Based on this reasoning 
several authors have argued that the mandatory character of corporate law in Europe 
compromises the contracting flexibility required for VC financings
385. At first sight this 
argument seems plausible; there must be some rules in European corporate statutes that 
prohibit VCs from structuring the transactions, in the way they would want. But, is this 
really the case? Is there anything special in European corporate laws that proscribes the 
attachment of the standard cash flow and control rights to the security that VCs hold? In 
                                                 
383 Nidal Rashid Sabri, Using Treasure “Repurchase” Shares to Stabilize Stock Markets, 8 INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 426, 437-438  
384 Enriques & Macey, supra note 380, 1169  
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other words, is it illegitimate for a VC to fully or partially replicate the characteristics of 
US-style VC convertible preferred stock in European jurisdictions? 
Empirical data
386 and surveys of national corporate laws on the characteristics, 
which  are  pertinent  to  VC  transactions
387,  show  that  all  the  features  of  US-style  VC 
convertible preferred stock, with the exception of full-blown redemption rights
388, are 
indeed fully available by statute to European VCs. To be sure, convertible preferred stock 
is used in 53.8% of VC financings in countries of French legal origin and in 48.8% of VC 
financings in countries of German legal origin. Anti-dilution protections are found in 
73.9% of the contracts in countries of French legal origin and in 50.0% of the contracts in 
countries of German legal origin. Liquidation preferences for more than the invested 
funds are present in 66.7% of the French legal origin VC financings and in 43.9% of the 
German,  while  state-contingent  board  control  is  found  in  42.3%  of  French  origin 
contracts and in 65.1% of the German origin contracts
389. Due to capital maintenance 
rules  that  are  prominent  in  most  European  corporate  statutes  the  percentage  of 
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redemption  rights  is  low,  but  European  VCs  compensate  with  other  senior  exit 
mechanisms.  
These  data  show  that  European  corporate  laws  do  not  stand  in  the  way  of 
structuring a sophisticated VC financial contract and that it is both legitimate and feasible 
for a VC to replicate the features of the securities that US VCs use. Despite the fact that 
corporate statutes in Europe proscribe many other corporate finance transactions, thus 
compromising the contracting and financial flexibility of private European firms, there is 
no such effect with regard to VC transactions. European VCs may bargain for all the 
standard cash flow and control rights that US VCs successfully use without running the 
risk of having their contract repudiated by the court. In conclusion, the mandatory nature 
of many European corporate laws does not directly impede efficient VC contracting. 
D. Contractual Path Dependence and Mandatory Corporate Law 
Although European mandatory corporate laws do not specifically prevent US-
style VC contractual structures from being transferred to most European jurisdictions, 
their general rigidity can be thought of as having an impact on the innovative capacity of 
European lawyers, who are those that are called to structure VC transactions
390. 
 As a general matter, a mandatory legal regime is expected to lead lawyers and 
law firms to underinvest in contract innovation. When lawyers are not used to opt out of 
the rules of a corporate statute, because in the great majority of cases they are not allowed 
to do so, then it is expected that because of anchoring bias they will be reluctant to 
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expend effort and costs in transacting around the few optional rules that are left
391. Due to 
the fact that in Europe most of the rules are fixed, corporate law in general, including its 
few default rules, is viewed by legal practitioners as an “anchor”, as an established given 
reference point, adjustments to which are rare
392.  
In other words, mandatory corporate law creates the problem of path dependence 
in commercial transactions; lawyers are locked in inefficient contractual structures and do 
not  have  the  incentive  to  invest  resources  in  acquiring  innovative  skills,  which  are 
necessary in order to structure efficient VC transactions. Instead, many of them preserve 
the status quo in VC financial contracts by using common equity
393 and are hesitant to 
expend resources in learning Silicon-Valley contractual techniques by fear that the latter 
are either inapplicable in Europe or will be eventually repudiated by courts
394. To be sure, 
even a cost-benefit analysis might deter lawyers and law firms from investing in learning 
financially  advanced  techniques,  since  the  knowledge  gained  will  only  be  used  in  a 
minority of transactions that do not yield enough fees in order to compensate lawyers for 
the  time  and  resources  expended  in  training.  Thus,  European  lawyers  may  rationally 
anchor in the usage of traditional financing techniques that result in suboptimal corporate 
governance structures in VC-backed firms. 
The argument that a mandatory system of corporate law creates anchoring bias 
and thus acts as a deterrent to contract innovation is consistent with the general premise 
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that is found in the law and development literature that countries with a highly mandatory 
statutory law exhibit less legal innovation than countries with a more enabling law
395. 
Legal innovation, namely the adjustment of a legal system to a dynamic environment, is a 
resultant not only of public lawmaking, but also of private lawmaking. That means that 
the  general  innovative  capacity  of  a  legal  system  does  not  depend  only  on  the 
responsiveness of the legislator and the regulatory authorities to the changes in society, 
but also on the ability of lawyers to engage in creative legal engineering
396.  
Michael Powell has identified four different levels, at which lawyers contribute to 
lawmaking and legal innovation
397. At the first and the second level, lawyers represent 
the private interests of their clients before legislative bodies and administrative agencies 
by being proactive and encouraging the authorities to enact laws that serve their clients’ 
interests. An example of this type of private interests representation is when lawyers 
associated  with  activist  investors  in  2007  coordinated  the  pass  of  the  North  Dakota 
Publicly Traded Corporations Act, which would serve their client’s goals
398. Thus, at the 
first and the second level lawyers can indirectly contribute to the innovation of the public 
lawmaking.  
 At the third and the fourth level lawyers engage in the development of private 
law. At the third level, lawyers are able to help shape the case law in certain field by 
presenting novel legal arguments to the court, whereas at the fourth level lawyers take 
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advantage of gaps in the law and engineer original devices, such as tax shelters, takeover 
defenses and hybrid securities that create value for their clients. It is at this fourth level 
that lawyers need innovative capacity the most and it is thus expected that a mandatory 
corporate law regime that restricts corporate finance options and cements governance 
structures does not encourage lawyers to engage in this category of activities, even when 
there are “optional isles” within the law that would allow them to do so. Thus, under a 
strict legal regime the contribution of lawyers to private lawmaking is expected to stop at 
the third level. 
 In  a  professional  culture  where  practitioners  are  used  to  engineer  mere 
compliance and not innovative devices, lawyers are not expected to grab the opportunity 
and  be  creative,  when  the  law  occasionally  allows  it.  Consequently,  the  rigidity  of 
European corporate laws has indirectly compromised the innovative skills that lawyers 
need in the VC arena to adopt or create new techniques. This might be an additional 
reason of why the sophisticated and innovative instrument of convertible preferred stock 
is not used more often in Europe; this might be an additional reason of why Europe lags 




 In a private company setting corporate governance institutions can be viewed as 
responses  to  the  contractual  challenges  of  moral  hazard,  adverse  selection  and 
incompleteness  of  contracts.  As  a  consequence  the  features  of  corporate  governance 
mechanisms are structured in a way that allows the corporate constituencies to deal with   102 
contractual  design  exigencies.  Contract  theory  is  thus  a  determinant  of  corporate 
governance. 
VC-backed firms provide a representative example of this philosophy of design of 
corporate governance institutions. The financing practices that VC firms implement and 
the securities that they hold are carefully designed so as to allow the members of the firm 
to surmount the contractual obstacles. Staged investment (or staggered financing) is a 
screening mechanism that induces entrepreneurs to signal their intrinsic motivation to the 
VC firm and thus allows the latter to tackle the adverse selection problem. Convertible 
preferred stock, the VCs’ investing vehicle of choice, allows the establishment of an 
incentive-compatible income stream, as it replicates the disciplining and agency cost-
mitigating effects of paradigm debt while at the same time it eliminates the foremost 
agency  cost  of  paradigm  debt,  the  “asset  substitution  effect”.  Consequently,  with  the 
“debtlike”  security  of  convertible  preferred  stock  VCs  can  cope  efficiently  with  the 
problem  of  moral  hazard.  In  addition  to  this,  the  covenants  embedded  in  convertible 
preferred stock help to generate an optimal state-contingent allocation of control rights 
that is in alignment with the basic axioms of financial contracting theory. Thereupon, 
convertible preferred stock serves as a mechanism that challenges the problem of the 
incompleteness of contracts. 
Finally, given that the design of efficient corporate governance institutions in a 
VC  setting  requires  a  great  deal  of  contracting  flexibility,  we  look  at  the  mandatory 
nature of European corporate laws and seek to ascertain whether they directly impede VC 
contracting. Although no such evidence is found, it is argued that the overall mandatory 
nature  of  European  corporate  laws  compromises  the  contract  innovation  capacity  of   103 
European  lawyers,  who  paralyzed  by  anchoring  bias  do  not  invest  in  learning 
sophisticated VC financial and corporate governance design techniques that would let the 
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